Drinking Wine Touched By A Non-Observant Jew

I recently received a wonderful sefer written by Harav J. David Bleich shlit”a entitled “Contemporary Halakhic Problems Vol. 7”. In this sefer Harav Bleich discusses many topics, however, one in particular is extremely relevant to those in kiruv and that is drinking the wine touched by a non-observant Jew. I urge anyone to purchase this sefer (here is a link- https://www.korenpub.com/maggid_en_usd/contemporary-halakhic-problems.html) and learn that topics, and other topics, in depth.

The Source

Our Sages forbade all non-Jewish wine, or even wine that was touched by a non-Jew, as a precaution to avoid intermarriage (Avoda Zara 29). The Rishonim write that one may not even drink wine that was touched by Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos (Bahag Shechita, Beis Yosef 119 citing the Rashba).

The Chasam Sofer (Y.D. 120, see also Har Tzvi Y.D. 105) wonders why the wine is prohibited if one may marry a Jew who desecrates Shabbos and there is no concern of intermarriage. He explains, based on the Gemara in Chullin (5), that if one serves Idolatry he is punished that he has the hallachic status of a non-Jew. Similarly, one who desecrates Shabbos in the presence of ten Jews has the halachic status of a non-Jew. The reason for this is that we keep Shabbos because Hashem rested on the seventh day after creating the world in the first six days. One who does not keep Shabbos is thereby questioning the fact that Hashem rested after creating the world. Therefore, one who desecrates Shabbos is akin to serving Idolatry and is therefore punished that he strictly treated as non-Jew in halacha. Since he has the status of a non-Jew his wine is forbidden, even though there is no concern of intermarriage. This same line of reasoning can be extended to prohibit the bread baked by a non-observant Jew.

Publicly Desecrating Shabbos:

However, the Poskim stress that there are many requirements that one needs to meet to be classified in hallacha as a “public” desecrater of shabbos. And if one fails to meet these requirements he is considered a “private” desecrater of shabbos and keeps his status of a Jew in hallacha. The following are some of those requirements:

The Baal Haitur (cited in Beis Yosef Y.D. 44 and Tashbeitz 3:43) writes that only one who violates shabbos through working the fields (planting, threshing etc.) is deemed a public desecrater of shabbos. One who violates shabbos in any other fashion keeps his hallachic status of a Jew. Rav Akiva Eiger zt”l (Y.D. 264 see also Daas Torah Y.D. 2:27) writes that he does not understand the reasoning of the Baal Haitur. He also notes that he no other posek shares the same view and it is therefore difficult to rely upon his opinion for a hallachic ruling.

The Chaya Adam rules that if one were to refrain from breaking Shabbos in front of a rabbi (or ones parents) he keeps the hallachic status of a Jew. It is clear that he feels a level of embarrassment for his actions and is not turning his back completely on his religion.17

כתבו הפוסקים דכל שבוש מלחלל שבת בפני אדם חשוב כגון רב וכדו’ אין דינו כמחלל שבת בפרהסיא לענין זה שחשיב כגוי. וכ”כ החיי אדם (כלל ע”ה ס”ק כ”ו): “ישראל מומר או רשע שמחלל שבת בפרהסיא, אפילו אינו מחלל אלא באיסור דרבנן, הרי הוא כנכרי וכו’ ואם מתבייש לחלל בפני אדם גדול, לא מיקרי בפרהסיא”. אולם המנחת אלעזר (ח”ג ס’ כ”ד) חולק עליו. ובספר הליכות שלמה חלק ג’ דף שכ”ה הביא מהג”ר שלמה זלמן אורבך זצ”ל וז”ל: “וה”ה כשבוש בכך בפני אביו או אמו וכדו’ ואינו מחלל שבת במחיצתם, וכהיום רבים מאלה שלצערנו אינם שומרי תומ”צ הריהם בכלל זה”. ועוד שם הביא מתלמידים וז”ל: “ומ”מ מה שנמנע מלחלל שבת בפני אחיו וכדו’ היה נראה מדברי רבינו דאין לראות זאת אלא כנימוס בעלמא ולא מפני הבושה וכו’ ואף לענין הנמנע מלחלל שבת לפני אדם חשוב, הורה רבינו דאם ניכר להדיא שהימנעותו היא אך ורק מפני הנימוס גרידא ולא מפני הבושה, אין להקל”.

Rav Akiva Eiger zt”l (ibid.) feels that one is required to violate shabbos in the presence of ten shabbos observant Jews and only then is he considered one who violated shabbos on a public level. Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Y.D. 70) disagrees and explains that this hallacha applies even if one breaks shabbos in the presence of ten non-observant Jews.

The Achronim disagree if one violates shabbos through a rabbinic act (ex. Muktza) if he then has the status of a public desecrater of shabbos or does the hallacha apply only to those who desecrate shabbos on a biblical level.(see Radvaz 2:796, Rav Akiva Eiger Y.D. 2 and Yabia Omer 1 Y.D. 11:24)

Tinuk Shenishba:

Even one who desecrates Shabbos publicly according to all of the authorities may still have the status of a Jew in halacha, as we shall explain. The Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva (3:9), after defining minim, apikorsim, and kofrim as individuals who reject one of the many principles of Judaism, writes: “Among Israel, there are two categories of mumarim: a mumar in regard to a single mitzvah and a mumar in regard to the entire Torah. A mumar in regard to a single mitzvah is someone who has made a practice of willfully committing a particular sin [to the point where] he is accustomed to committing it… [This applies] even though [the sin] is one of the minor ones. For example, someone who has made a practice of constantly wearing sha’atnez or cutting off his sideburns so that it appears that, in regard to him, it is as if this mitzvah has been nullified entirely. Such a person is considered a mumar in regard to that matter. This applies [only] if he [commits the sin] with the intent of angering G-d. An example of a mumar in regard to the entire Torah is one who turned to the faith of the gentiles when they enact [harsh] decrees [against the Jews] and clings to them.”

In Hillchos Shechita (4:14), the Rambam writes that a Jew who serves idolatry or one who publicly desecrates shabbos is considered (in hallacha) like a non-Jew and if he slaughters, the animal is rendered a neveilah. Thus the Rambam has described people who are deficient in their observance of the mitzvos. It would thus seem that all non-observant Jews fall into one of these categories.

This would indeed be the case if not for a distinction made by the Rambam. The Rambam in hilchos Mamrim (3:3) writes the following: “To whom does this all apply? Only to a person who denied the Oral Law consciously and instead followed after his frivolous thoughts… The children of these errant people and their grandchildren whose parents led them away and they were born among these Karaities and raised according to their conception, they are considered as ‘children captured amongst the nations and raised by them’ (Tinokos Shenishbu). Such a child may not be eager to follow the path of mitzvot, for it is as if he was compelled not to. Even if later, he hears that he is Jewish and saw Jews and their faith, he is still considered as one who was compelled against observance, for he was raised according to their mistaken path… Therefore it is appropriate to motivate them to repent and draw them to the power of the Torah with words of peace.” The Rambam is thus telling us a very novel concept and that is, in order to determine the hallachic status of any Jew we must first inquire into the many different factors which have determined his development and behavior.

The Poskim have employed the opinion of the Rambam and have ruled leniently regarding many Sabbath desecrators that they remain their status of Jews. Rav Yehuda Ettlinger zt”l (Binyan Tzion 23) writes that the derogatory label of a public desecrater of shabbos, which implies brazen rejection of the belief in the Creation of the universe, cannot be attributed to many German Jews who lit candles, made Kiddush etc., yet openly violated the laws of the Shabbos. He writes: “The only reason a Sabbath violator is considered a mumar is because he who denies creation and the Creator as well. However, this person confesses his faith by prayer, Kiddush etc. Certainly the children of these people never knew and never heard of the laws of Shabbos and they are in all respects… like a tinok shenishba bein ha-akum. This is the case unless it is clear to us that a particular individual is familiar with the laws of Shabbos and brazenly desecrates Shabbos in the presence of ten men despite this knowledge. Such a person is definitely considered a mumar.”

This heter can obviously not be applied blindly to all non-observant Jews as there are many Jews who do not fall under the category of tinuk shenishba. This, like all halachos, requires discretion and the consultation of a noted posek.

It is also worthy to note the opinion of Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe 1:33). Rav Moshe was asked how to determine the status of many Jews who believe that G-d Created the universe, however, due to fear of losing their livelihood are forced to work on Shabbos. He ruled leniently regarding the matter and his reasoning may be applicable to our discussion. He begins by explaining that the reason a “public” desecrater of Shabbos has the status of a non-Jew while one who desecrates shabbos privately receives no change of status, even though both acts are inherently the same. He explains that desecrating Shabbos is only considered a brazen act of kefira (heresy) if one does so to attack G-d and Judaism. If one does so for reasons of monetary gain and the like should not be classified as a non-Jew. Therefore, when one violates shabbos privately we are allowed to assume that he is doing so out of necessity and not as an act of aggression towards G-d. This leniency is not given towards a public desecration of Shabbos because the act itself is perceived by onlookers as an act of aggression and even if he is adamant that he is doing so for personal reasons we do not believe him. If that is the case, advances Rav Moshe, the argument can be made that even if one publicly desecrates Shabbos if it is clear to all the onlookers that he is doing so only for monetary reasons (which was the case at the time of Rav Moshe as many Jews would daven Vasikin, make Kiddush and then drive to work) he remains a Jew in halacha. The same argument can possibly be made regarding the vast majority of non-observant Jews. Since the average onlooker excuses their actions as being based on a lack of education of Judaism and its laws and not as an act of aggression towards G-d, we cannot classify them as non-Jews in halacha.

Practical Halacha

The poskim debate whether one may drink wine that is touched by a non-observant Jew. According to Harav Henkin zt”l (Peirushei Ibra 5:4) one may rule leniently. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l also defends those that rule leniently. This is especially true in light of the above mentioned heterim (tinuk shenishba etc.). However, many poskim, including Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l, Harav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg zt”l, Harav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt”l, rule stringently on the matter. For normative halacha, a rav should be consulted.

 

For a full discussion on this topic see Sefer Umekareiv Biyamin vol. 1 page 212 (http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=51347&st=&pgnum=236&hilite=). In addition,  I gave on the topic of drinking wine touched by a non-observant Jew, here is a link- (https://www.torahanytime.com/video/wine-touched-by-a-non-observant-jew/)

Panim Chadashos

Panim Chadashos

1) The sheva brachos cannot be recited unless at least one of the adult male participants is a panim chadashos. Panim chadashos, literally translated as “new face,” means that he was not present at the wedding dinner or at a previous sheva brachos for this couple. (S.A. E.H. 62:7) If there are no panim chadashos present, only the last of the sheva brachos, “asher bara” is recited.

2) According to the Rambam, two panim chadashos are required. This ruling was codified by the Ben Ish Chai (Shoftim 15). Many sefaradim follow this view.(See Yabia Omer 3 E.H. 11)

3) A person who attended the chuppah, but did not attend the wedding meal, still may be  considered panim chadashos. (S.A. E.H. 62:7) Harav Moshe Stern zt”l writes that this is true even if he ate at a buffet before the chuppah. (Beer Moshe 2:119)

4) If he was present at the wedding meal or one of the sheva brachos meals, he can no longer be considered the panim chadashos, regardless of if he ate while he was there. (Hanisuin K’Hilchosom page 523) Therefore, if a person went to a wedding to wish mazal tov to the chosson and kallah, he can no longer serve as the panim chadashos, even if he did not eat at the wedding at all. (Yismach Lev vol. 3 page 24)

5) A woman cannot serve as the panim chadashos. (Pischei Teshuva 62:14)

6) A child cannot serve as the panim chadashos. (Pischei Teshuva ibid.)

7) The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 62:8) writes that the panim chadashos is a person who is important enough that extra food is generally prepared in his honor and someone whose presence brings additional simcha. It seems that Rashi disagrees with this notion and feels that any person can serve as the panim chadashos. (See Shitah Mekubetzes Kesubos 7b) While this appears to be the prevalent custom, the Ben Ish Chai writes that it may be preferred to adhere to the strict ruling of the Shulchan Aruch. (See Ben Ish Chai Shoftim 16 and Hanisuin K’Hilchosom page 524) It is reported that the Chazon Ish also sought after panim chadashos who were very honorable. (Shalmei Simcha page 353)

8) The Sefer Hanisuin K’Hilchosom (page 525) cites an argument among the poskim as to whether a waiter at the restaurant where the sheva brachos are taking place can serve as the panim chadashos. For normative halacha, a rabbi should be consulted.

9) There are numerous opinions among the poskim as to whether the panim chadashos must partake of the meal. The Rama (62:7) rules that the panim chadashos does not need to eat at the sheva brachos meal. This ruling is codified by the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch. (149:5) The Sefer China V’Chisda (vol. 1 page 111) writes that the blessings are only recited if the panim chadashos eats something at the meal. This is also recorded in the Sefer Nesivei Am (vol. 2 page 8). Harav Avraham Farasko zt”l maintains that the panim chadashos must eat bread at the meal in order for the blessings to be recited. (Birech Es Avraham 71:32)

10) The panim chadashos must be present during the recitation of the sheva brachos. If the panim chadashos leaves before the blessings were recited, the poskim debate whether the blessings are recited. If the panim chadashos leaves in middle of the recitation of the blessings, the poskim disagree whether the remaining blessings are recited. For normative halacha, a rabbi should be consulted. (refer to Hanisuin K’Hilchosom page 526)

11) Days in which the panim chadashos are unnecessary- When sheva brachos take place at either one of the first two meals of Shabbos or Yom Tov, (see Bitzeil Hachochma 1:64) there is no need for an additional panim chadashos because the Shabbos and Yom Tov themselves are considered to be eminent “guests” who fulfill the role of panim chadashos. (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 62:8)

12) The poskim debate whether panim chadashos are required during the third Shabbos meal, known as seudas shlishis. The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 62:5) rules that Panim Chadashos are required. The Rama M’Pano maintains that, kabbalistically the seudas shlishis is also considered a “guest” and panim chadashos are not required. (Pischei Teshuva 62:16)

 

Other poskim maintain that panim chadashos are required. However, if divrei Torah are delivered at the meal, the Torah is considered the “guest” of honor and the blessings are recited. (Shulchan Haezer 12:3) Preferably, the divrei Torah should be said by the chosson, (See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 149:5) but if he cannot do so, any formal drashah of divrei Torah is sufficient. It should be noted that many poskim, including Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l, maintain that divrei Torah can only substitute the panim chadashos during the third meal on Shabbos. If there is no panim chadashos on a weekday, one cannot recite divrei Torah and then recite the blessings. (Shalmei Simcha 352)

Chanukah and Rosh Chodesh are not considered “guests” and panim chadashos are required.

13) The Sefer Yafeh Lalev writes that one does not require panim chadashos on Chol Hamoed. (Bitzeil Hachochma 2:1) Others, including Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l, disagree. (Yabia Omer 3 O.C. 23)

14) Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l rules that panim chadashos are required on Purim.

The Fast of Asara B’Teves

  1. The Fast of the Tenth of Teves marks the day that Nevuzadran, the Babylonian general, laid siege to Jerusalem prior to the destruction of the first Holy Temple. The siege lasted almost three years until the city walls were breached and the Temple was destroyed. This was the beginning of a long line of disasters on the Jewish people, including the first exile, and the destruction of the second Temple. This day is commemorated by refraining from eating and drinking from sunrise to nightfall.
  2. The purpose of the fast day is to stir our hearts in order that we utilize the paths of teshuva, repentance, and to serve as a reminder to us of our own actions and those of our forefathers. These iniquities are responsible for the terrible events which befell our people. Remembering these tragedies should lead us to examine our conduct and return to Hashem. One should not mistakenly, assume that abstinence from food and drink alone fulfills the requirement and purpose of the fast day. Rather, the true purpose of a fast day must be evidenced in one’s improved deeds. (Mishnah Berurah 549:1)
  3. This year the fast begins on Suday (Jan. 8) at 5:51 a.m. and ends at 5:31 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time). Even though the fast begins from dawn, sometimes the prohibition against eating begins from the previous evening. For example, if, before the arrival of dawn, a person decides not to eat any more until the fast begins, he is seen as having accepted the fast upon himself, and it is now forbidden for him to eat. Therefore, if a person goes to bed in anticipation of the fast and then rises before dawn, it is forbidden for him to eat, for he diverted his thoughts from eating. If one wishes to wake up before dawn (5:51) and eat or drink, he should stipulate before going to sleep that he intends to wake up early to eat or drink and that the fast should not begin until dawn. The Shulchan Aruch (564) rules that if one did not make this stipulation he may not eat or drink. However, according the Rama he may still drink, even without making a stipulation.
  4. Both men and women must fast on Asara B’Teves. (Shulchan Aruch 550:1)
  5. The Shulchan Aruch (554:5) writes that a pregnant woman need not fast on Asara B’Teves. The Rama (550:1), however, writes that if the pregnant or nursing woman is feeling good the custom is to fast. If she feels week she need not fast. Many poskim explain that the accepted practice today, even among Ashkenazic women, is for pregnant and nursing women to refrain from observing the minor fasts. And even a woman who wishes to be stringent and to observe the fast – if she experiences difficulty during her fast, or if the fast causes her to have less milk, thus causing discomfort to the baby, it is best that she refrain from fasting. (Orchos Chaim Spinka 550:4 and Siddur Yaavetz) For normative halacha, a rav should be consulted.
  6. Nonetheless, if the woman isn’t fasting she shouldn’t eat lavish meals with meat and wine, but rather only what is necessary. (Shulchan Aruch ibid. and Mishnah Berurah 550:5)
  7. The pregnant or nursing woman who does not fast need not make up the fast on a different day. (Yechava Daas 1:35)
  8. One who is sick, even if there is no danger of dying is exempt from fasting and shouldn’t fast. Before one decides to break his fast he should first consult with a rav. If one is sick and does not fast he need not make up his fast on a different day. (Yechava Daas ibid. and Mishnah Berurah Biur Halacha 550)
  9. One need not train his children to fast, even at the age of twelve for boys or eleven for girls. Once they have reached the age of chinuch they shouldn’t eat lavish meals, but rather only what is necessary. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l and ybc”l Harav Neventzhal shlit”a write that although many boys have the custom to fast three fasts before they become bar-mitzvah, this custom has no source. (Mishnah Berurah 550:5, Halichos Shlomo vol. 3 page 398-399 and B’Yitzchak Yikare on Mishnah Berurah)
  10. The Mishnah Berurah (567:11) maintains that only if one is in pain may one rinse one’s mouth on Asara B’Teves and in such a case one should bend one’s head downward so one doesn’t swallow any water.
  11. If one has bad breath and it causes him discomfort or embarrassment, he may use mouthwash on Asara B’Teves. He may also brush his teeth with toothpaste but not with water. (Beer Moshe 8:94, Minchas Yitzchak 4:109)
  12. If one needs to take medicine on Asara B’Teves he may take them without water. If he can not swallow the pills without a little water, he may swallow a very small amount of water (just enough to get the pills down). (Opinion of Rav Debreczin zt”l cited in Nitev Gavriel Bein Hatzomos page 54)
  13. If one ate by mistake on a fast day he should nevertheless continue fasting afterwards. (Shulchan Aruch and Mishanh Berurah 568:1) The Mishna Brurah (568:3) says that even if one ate on a taanis, you can still say aneinu during the shemoneh esrei. Harav Wosner zt”l (Shevet Halevi 5:60) explains that this is only true for someone who began the fast and ate accidentally. However, one who is exempt from fasting altogether does not recite aneinu.
  14. Many have the custom to recite Avinu Malkeinu on public fast days. One can even say Avinu Malkeinu when davening without a minyan. (Ishei Yisroel 45:45)

Writing Secular Dates In Documents

1)  There is a debate regarding the best way to identify the secular months when writing invitations, documents etc.. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yabia Omer 3 YD 9) cites the Ramban who stresses the importance of counting months according to the Jewish calendar. When the Torah says that Nissan is the first month of the year, it is implying that one may not consider any other month to be the “first.” Therefore, Harav Ovadia concludes, when writing the secular months one should not refer to them by number, but by name. For example, one should write January, 12, 2016 and not 1/12/2016.25 A similar ruling is expressed by Harav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt”l. (Shalmei Simcha page 687)
2) The Tzitz Eliezer (8:8) disagrees with the ruling of Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l. He writes that because the months are named after gentile gods, one may not mention the months by name, but should instead refer to them by number.

3) Harav Hershel Schachter shlit”a, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivas Rabbeinu Yitzchak Elchonon, in a letter addressed to the author, writes that he feels that it is preferable to write the name of the month than to reference it by number. Harav Noach Isaac Oelbaum shlit”a, in a letter addressed to the author, explains that it is difficult to advance a clear hallachic ruling. However, he personally adheres to the view of Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l and refers to the secular months by name and not by number.

Chanukah (Assorted Halachos)

1) On all eight days of Chanukah, complete Hallel is said. (Shulchan Aruch 683:1) If one accidentally only recited a “Chatzi Hallel” (he omitted the chapters of Lo Lanu and Ahavti), he should repeat the complete Hallel without reciting the Brachos at the beginning and end of Hallel. (Ishei Yisroel page 481, regarding Hallel on Pesach, citing the view of Harav Wosner zt”l in Shevet Halevi 7:62. See, however, Rivevos Efraim 4:105 who maintains that one should recite the blessings as well.)
2)The Zohar Hakadosh (Shemos 12a) writes that during the months of Teves, Av, and Tamuz the middah of din, judgement, is very pronounced in the world. The Minchas Elazar of Munkatch (3:66) writes that based on this teaching of the Zohar, the Rav of Rozvadov zt”l encouraged his children not to marry during these three months. Similarly, the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt”l (Igros Kodesh Vol. 18 Page 16), in a letter to one of his followers, writes that, “Our custom is not to make weddings during the month of Teves.” Perhaps the reason that Chabad Chassidim refrain from marrying during the month of Teves is due to the words of the Zohar Hakadosh. Sqaure Chassidim also refrain from making weddings during the month of Teves. (Netai Gavriel Nisuin 48:37) However, the Minchas Elazar continues to note that the common custom is to allow for weddings to take place during the month of Teves. Harav Gavriel Zinner shlit”a, citing the Pupa Rebbe zt”l, explains that everyone agrees that one is allowed to get married during Chanukah, even though a few days of Chanukah take place during the month of Teves. (Netai Gavriel ibid.)
3) It is a mitzvah for a mourner to serve as the chazzan during the eleven months that he recites kaddish. (Rama 376:4) The poskim debate whether a mourner may serve as the chazzan onChanukah: A- Some say that he may serve as the chazzan for Mincha and Maariv, but not for Shachris since Hallel is recited. (M.B. 684:1) B- Some disagree and hold that he may serve as the chazzan during Shachris until after Shemoneh Esrei, but should be replaced for Hallel. (M.B. 581:7, citing Machatzis Hashekel) C- While some poskim hold that a mourner does not serve as chazzan at all during Chanukah. (M.B. ibid, citing Gra) Many chassidim follow this last view. For normativa halacha, one should follow his family custom.
4) The Shulchan Aruch  (670 1,3) rules that one may not deliver a hesped, eulogy, on Chanukah. However, a eulogy for a talmid chochom in his presence is permitted. Harav Neventzhal shlit”a cites Rav Yosef Chaim Zonnenfeld zt”l, who refused to discuss negative news or sad reports on Chanukah. He felt that talking about something depressing is akin to delivering a eulogy and is not appropriate for Chanukah. (BYitzchak Yikareh 670)
5) On Chanukah, when lighting the menorah, one should not speak between the brachos and the beginning of the lighting of the candles. If one did speak, if the conversation concerned the lighting itself, he is not required to repeat the brachos. If the conversation did not concern the lighting, he is required to repeat the brachos. (See M.B. 432:5 and Laws ofChanukah by Rav Shimon Eider page 28) Preferably, one should not speak until he completed lighting all the candles. However, if he spoke after lighting at least one candle the brachos are not repeated. (Laws of Chanukah ibid.)
6) The poskim debate whether one should light the Chanukah lights before reciting Havdalah this Motzei Shabbos, or is Havdalah recited before kindling the Chanukah lights. (See Shulchan Aruch, Rama, Mishnah Berurah and Biur Halacha 681 for full discussion) In shul, the custom is to light Chanukah lights first. At home, however, since there is basis for both views, one should continue to conduct himself according to his own custom. If one has no specific custom he should perform Havdalah first and then kindle the Chanukah lights. (Opinion of Harav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin zt”l cited in Luach and of Harav Shimon Eider zt”l in Halachos of Chanukah page 44)
7) During Chanukah, many refrain from visiting the cemetery on the death anniversary of relatives, because such a visit is liable to evoke tears and eulogizing, acts forbidden during Chanukah. Instead, they visit the cemetery before or after Chanukah. Others do not refrain from going to the cemetery on Chanukah, and this is the practice of some Ashkenazi communities. (See Gesher Hachaim 29:5) However, all permit visiting the graves of the righteous duringChanukah (Ben Ish Chai) (See also Yalkut Yosef Kitzur Shulchan AruchChanukah who cites those that are strict but who concludes that “those who act leniently have whom to rely on).
8) From a half hour prior to the time of lighting the menorah (approximately 10-15 minutes before sunset) one may not eat. (M.B. 672:10) A snack, however, is permitted. (Halachos of Chanukah by Rav Shimon Eider page 22) The definition of snack, for this discussion, is fruit and drinks. One may also eat bread and mezonos less than the size of a volume of an egg. (see Piskei Teshuvos page 479). The custom is for women to refrain from eating as well, even though they don’t light themselves. However, if a woman is not feeling well she may eat. (Bitzeil Hachochma 4:58 and Netai Gavriel Chanukah 5:5) If one wishes to eat before lighting the menorah (for example he will be at work late and won’t light for hours) he should appoint a shomer to remind him to light and this will permit him to eat. (Netai Gavriel 5:6)
9)  The time for lighting the Chanukah candles on Friday is after Plag Hamincha, before sunset, and should burn a half hour after Tzeis Hakochavim. Therefore, care should be taken to see that there should be enough oil in the Menorah at the time of the lighting, to burn for the required amount of time.
10) One should preferably daven Mincha first and then kindle the Chanukah lights. However, if this is not possible, one may light first and then daven Mincha. One should rather daven Mincha with a minyan after lighting the Chanukah candles, then daven alone before lighting the candles. (See Shulchan Aruch 679 and Mishnah Berurah 2)
11)  On Erev Shabbos, the Chanukah lights are kindled before the Shabbos candles even if a man is lighting the Shabbos candles. The reason is that there is a view which holds that men are mekabel Shabbos when he lights the Shabbos candles and melacha is prohibited. Although most poskim disagree with this view, and feel that men are not mekabel Shabbos when lighting the Shabbos candles, the custom is to preferably conduct himself accordingly.
12) However, if a man lit the Shabbos candles and did not intend to usher in Shabbos, he may kindle the Chanukah lights afterwards. This Halacha concerns a man, who does not accept Shabbos by lighting the Shabbos candles. However, when a woman lights the Shabbos candles, the custom is that the she does accept Shabbos and is prohibited from doing any melacha. Therefore, if she should, accidentally, light the Shabbos candles, she is no longer permitted to kindle the Chanukah lights. She should, instead, instruct another person to light for her (as long as it is before sunset) and recite the blessing “Lehadlik Ner Shel Chanuka” on her behalf. She may, however, recite “Sheasa Nissim”. (Mishnah Berurah 679:1)

Bishul Akum (Assorted Halachos)

1) The Mishna, Avodah Zarah, 35b, states that it is prohibited to eat food that was cooked by a non-Jew (bishul akum). This prohibition applies even if all of the ingredients are assumed to be kosher.

2) Although the poskim use the term akum, which literally translates a worshiper of stars and constellations (avodas kochavim u’mazalos), or idolater, the prohibition of bishul akum applies equally to any non-Jew, regardless in his belief. Therefore, food baked by a Moslem or even a non-Jew who keeps the seven Noahide laws is subject to this prohibition. This prohibition was created to avoid intermarriage and therefore all non-Jewish cooking is forbidden. (Darkei Teshuva 112:4)
3) It should also be stressed that whenever we “permit” eating food cooked by a non-Jew, we are assuming that the food is completely free of any non-kosher material and that it has been prepared in kosher utensils. One who has not checked the ingredients of the food and the manner in which it was prepared may not eat any food from a non-Jewish (or an unreliable Jewish) chef.
4) The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 38a, notes that the prohibition of bishul akum is due to a rabbinic enactment. Rashi presents two distinct reasons for this prohibition. Rashi in one area writes that the prohibition of bishulakum is based upon the concern that eating food cooked by a non-Jew may lead to close friendship, intimacy and eventually intermarriage, Rashi in another area writes that the chazal prohibited bishul akum out of concern that the non-Jew may add non-kosher ingredients to the food. (Beis Yosef Y.D. 113) The Sefer Divrei Yosef (3:790:4) writes that the accepted view is that of the first view of Rashi and that the prohibition was instituted in order to avoid intermarriage.
5) The Tiferet L’Moshe, cited by the Pischei Teshuva, notes that there is a practical difference between these two reasons regarding a Jewish idol-worshiper and a Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos. If the concern is one of intermarriage, there is no prohibition of marrying a Jewish idol-worshiper’s daughter. However, if the concern of bishul akum is that one may eat non-kosher, the prohibition equally applies to eating food prepared by someone who does not keep kosher. According to the Divrei Yosef, cited above, who maintains that the accepted reason is that of avoiding intermarriage, one would be permitted to eat food cooked by a non-observant Jew. However, practically the poskim debate whether one may not eat food cooked by a Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos. For normative halacha, a rav should be consulted.
6) Bishul Akum includes foods that are cooked, baked, roasted, fried or broiled by a non-Jew. The Rama (Y.D. 113:3) writes that only food cooked using “fire” is prohibited by bishul akum

7) In recent years, questions have been raised on the halachic status of microwave cooking. With microwave cooking, energy waves (i.e. microwaves) are generated that cause a molecular movement in the food substance. This movement causes friction between the molecules and in effect causes the food to heat itself. Because no form of “fire” is present in the cooking, there is reason to inquire whether microwave cooking is permitted.

 

Regarding Shabbos– With regard to hilchos Shabbos, the poskim debate whether cooking with a microwave is a biblical form of cooking or is it merely rabbinic. According to Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (SS”K 1:127) microwave cooking is not biblically prohibited, while Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe 3:52) rules that since microwave cooking is a common form of cooking, it is biblically forbidden.

Stringent– Harav Noach Isaac Oelbaum shlit”a (Minchas Chein vol. 1 page 177) discusses the use of microwaves with regard to bishul akum and he explains that according to Harav Moshe zt”l food cooked by a non-Jew in a microwave oven is considered bishul akum.16 A strict view was also expressed by Harav Shmuel Wosner zt”l (Shevet Halevi 8:185), Harav Shraga Feivish Schneebalg zt”l (Shraga Hameir 6:52:3) and Harav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l (Shvus Yitzchak vol. 6 page 61). In the OU Kosher Halacha Yomis series on Feb. 10, 2016 it states: “Although contemporary poskim differ on this question, the OU is not matir bishul akum through microwaves. Rabbi Genack once discussed this shailah with Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt”l, who told him that the OU should be machmir regarding cooking with microwaves.”

Lenient– However, there were poskim who permit food cooked by a non-Jew using a microwave. The arguments for leniency are that when one cooks with a microwave he is not cooking by fire and that microwave technology was not available at the time when Chazal created the prohibition of Bishul Akum decree and thus was not included in the prohibition. A permissible view can be found in the Seforim Chelkas Binyamin (page 106), Lehoros Nasan (7:64) and Rivevos Efraim (8:111). Similarly, Harav Moshe Heinemann shlit”a, in an article on the Star-K website, writes, “Bishul akum does not apply to microwaved food. The rabbinical prohibition of bishul akum applies only to conventional cooking methods through fire (e.g., cooking, frying, roasting). Food prepared through microwaving is not included in the prohibition.”

Normativa Halacha– Harav Asher Weiss shlit”a (Minchas Asher Devarim) discusses this question and he concludes that one may rule leniently in case of great need. Likewise, Harav Oelbaum shlit”a discusses this issue at length and he concludes, “The poskim debate whether food cooked in a microwave is subject to the laws of bishul akum. While one should initially (l’chatchila) rule stringently, b’dieved one may be lenient.”

8)  The Gemara in Avodah Zarah (38a) presents an important limitation to this rule prohibiting food cooked by a non-Jew, stating that any food which can be eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum, and may therefore be eaten if it is cooked by a non-Jew. It is for this reason that one may drink water that was boiled by non-Jew. (S.A. 113)

9) This applies even to food that tastes better cooked or baked than raw (e.g. baked apples or applesauce). The reason why our Chachomim permitted these dishes is because we can eat this food without the intervention of the aino Yehudi. We do not feel obliged to the cook for his assistance in preparation of these products, thereby lessening any social bond created by the food. (Chochmas Adam 66)

10) The Bach (112) and Shach (152:2) write that a “adam chashuv” (honorable person, such as a rabbi) should avoid eating any food cooked by a non-Jew even if the food is edible raw. Accordingly, rabbis should not drink water boiled by a non-Jew or fruit cooked by a non-Jew. However, the Pri Chadash, Noda Biyehuda and Aruch Hashulchan disagree and maintain that even an honorable person need not avoid eating edible raw food that was cooked by a non Jew.
11) In light of the above, an interesting question may be raised concerning drinking coffee prepared by a non-Jew: would it be subject to this prohibition against consuming something cooked by a non-Jew? (The assumption here is that there are, of course, no non-Kosher ingredients, which can be a problem with certain specially flavored coffees.) The area of doubt is that cooked water does not qualify for bishul akum, however, roasted coffee beans cannot be used without brewing and therefore should be subject to the rules of bishul akum.
12) The Shulchan Aruch (114) asserts that beer, which is essentially water mixed with various grains and brewed together, has the same status as water regarding this prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew just as the berachah recited before the consumption of beer, despite the grain content, is shehakol, the same as that for water. In both cases, the other ingredients are considered secondary to the water. Based on this idea, the Pri Chadash (114:6) rules that the same is true of coffee, which he holds may be drunk even if prepared by a non-Jew because the coffee beans are considered secondary to the water, and water is not subject to the prohibition of Bishul Akum.
Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yechava Daas 4:42) discusses this issue at length and while he notes that there are opinions who are stringent, the majority of opinions permit coffee brewed by a non-Jew. This is his opinion as well, he does add, however, that one who wishes to rule stringently is praiseworthy. The common practice seems to rule leniently.
13) The Pri Chadash (3) writes that the definition of “edible raw” depends upon the eating habits of the average person. If most people would not eat a particular food when raw, the food is subject to the laws of bishul akum, even for one who eats it raw. [For example, if a non-Jew cooks a potato for a Jew who eats raw potatoes, the Jew may not eat the cooked potato.] The reverse is true as well. If most people would eat a particular food raw, it is not subject to the laws of bishul akum even for one who does not eat it raw. [For example, if a non-Jew cooks a carrot for a Jew who eats only cooked carrots, the Jew may eat the cooked carrot.] Many authorities follow this view as well. (Chochmas Adam 66:4 and Aruch Hashulchan 12) This Pri Chadash is used by many poskim to ascertain whether fish in sushi is considered edible raw.
14) In the Daf Hakashrus (February 2014) Rav Yisroel Belsky zt”l and ybc”l Harav Herschal Shachter shlit”a explain there is another consideration that must be addressed before deeming certain types of fish as edible raw. While sushi is currently very popular, the raw fish is not eaten by itself, but rather with rice. They explain that in order to deem an item as edible raw, it would have to be something that people would eat by itself and not with rice or vegetables. [Although sashimi (raw fish) is eaten without any significant additional ingredients, sashimi is not as popular as sushi in the U.S. and one can question whether it is popular enough to assume that these species of fish are eaten raw (in the U.S.) based on sashimi alone.] Rav Shachter and Rav Belsky therefore conclude that we should not consider tuna a food that is edible raw since it is not commonly eaten on its own.
15)  The bishul akum prohibition applies only to a food that is “oleh al shulchan melachim,” fit to be served to a king. The prohibition of bishulakum is based upon concern that eating the non-Jew’s food will lead to intimacy, this applies only to important foods that will attract the Jew to the home of the non-Jew. A non-Jew will never invite a Jew to his home to eat solely snack food, such as popcorn. Therefore, eating a non-Jew’s popcorn will never lead to intimacy and is not prohibited. (See Rambam Machalos Asuros 17:15)
16) The poskim discuss the proper definition of “fit to be served to a king” and they offer many practical applications: 1) The Chida (cited by Kaf Hachaim 113:2) writes that it refers to food that would be served to anyone of nobility, and not limited to a king. This is also the view of the Ben Ish Chai (2 Chukas 9) and Kaf Hachaim. 2) Harav Moshe Heinemann shlit”a, Star-K Rabbinic Administrator, feels that all food that would be served at a State Dinner, hosted by the President of The United States of America (refer to Kashrus Kurrents by the Star-K “Food Fit For A King”). The Star-K has consulted the White House executive chef regarding what is served at a state dinner in order to determine what is “oleh al shulchan melachim.” 3) Rav Menachem Genack shlit”a (Mesorah 1 page 86) notes that most poskim are of the opinion that the food item must be fit to be served at a royal banquet. However, the Chazon Ish, in an oral communication with Rav Shimon Schwab zt”l, ruled that even something that a king would eat in an informal setting it subject to bishul akum. However, it seems that this view is not accepted by most authorities. 4) Harav Yisroel Belsky zt”l is cited as saying that all food that is fit to be served at a wedding smorgasbord are subject to the rules of bishul akum(refer to Hallachically Speaking Volume 7 Issue 1).
17)  A cursory analysis would seem to indicate that potato chips that were made only by a non-Jew are permissible and are not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. While potatoes certainly are inedible in their raw state and are only rendered edible by the intervention of the non-Jew, they certainly are not the type of food that would be found on the table of kings. As is written in the OU Kosher Document A-45, and is signed by Harav Yisroel Belsky zt”l, ybc”l Harav Schachter shlit”a and Harav Menachem Genack shlit”a, “French fries and potato chips do not require bishul yisroel because they are not served at a kings’ table.”
18) However, there were poskim who wished to explain that potato chips prepared by a non-Jew may be subject to the laws of bishul akum. They explain that the issue revolves around the following question: When looking at a given food item to determine whether or not it should be subject to the criterion of olah al shulchan melachim, how do we categorize the food. Do we determine this based on the type of food in question (i.e. a potato), regardless of how it was prepared, in effect saying since this food would olah al shulchan melachim in some form, therefore all forms would be prohibited or do we analyze each food and how it was prepared. Potatoes, in certain forms, are suitable to be served to a king. Potato chips, however, are not. The question is do we say all forms of potatoes are olah al shulchan malachim, even potato chips, since they are forms of a potato. Or do we analyze potato chips on their own and in their state they are not olah al shulchan malachim.
Harav Yaakov Kamanetzky zt”l (Emes L’Yaakov page 307) is cited as ruling that potato chips are subject to the prohibition of bishul akum since potatoes are fit to be served to a king.
Harav Yisroel Belsky zt”l (Shulchan Halevi page 341) discusses this issue at length and he feels very strongly, however, that potato chips do not require bishul yisroel and that we do not treat all potato products the same, as is attributed to Harav Yaakov Kamanetzky zt”l. This is also the view of Harav Moshe Stern zt”l (Beer Moshe 4:49), ybc”l Harav Pesach Eliyahu Falk shlit”a (Am Hatorah 3:10) and Harav Asher Weiss shlit”a (Minchas Ahser Devarim).
Rabbi Moshe Rosenstein, in the Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (Fall 2001), cites the lenient view of Harav Belsky and he adds that, “In addition to the approach of the OU, this is the view adopted by several other kashrus organizations as well, who require bishul Yisroel for fried potato foods like potato latkes, yet do not require a Jew’s involvement in the cooking of the potato chips which they certify. This is the approach adopted by the Star-K [related to the author in a conversation with Rabbi Avraham Mushell (in the name of Rav Moshe Heinemann shlit”a)] and the Kof-K [related to the author in a conversation with Rav Pinchas Juravel].” He continues to cite that the kashrus organization Kahal Adas Yeshurun (KAJ) follows the stricter view of Harav Yaakov Kamanetzky zt”l and they require potato chips to be bishul Yisroel.

Sitting In Parent’s seat

1) One has an obligation to honor and fear his parents. Including in the halachos of fearing one’s parents is the halacha that one may not sit in his parent’s seat. This is referring to the seat where the father davens in shul, the seat where he sits at home and the seat he occupies in his place of business. (See Kiddushin 31a, Ein Yaakov ibid, Tur, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 240:2 and Aruch Hashulchan 240:9) The reason for this law is that when one sits in his parent’s place he thereby gives the impression that he views himself as equal in importance to his parents. (Levush)

2) This law applies to the mother’s seat as well. Meaning if a mother has a set seat in one’s home or in shul or in her place of business, the child may not sit there. (Aruch Hashulchan 240:9 and Yalkut Yosef Kibud Av V’Em page 337)

3) According to the Ohr Hachaim Hakadosh (Rishon Litzion Y.D. 240:3) one must refrain from occupying his parent’s place only when the parent is present or if other people are present, but in private one may sit in his parent’s seat. This is also the view of Harav Ovadia Hadaye zt”l (Yaskil Avdi 7 Y.D. 21:8) However, the Taz (240:3) and the Aruch Hashulchan (240:9), maintain that one may not sit in one’s father’s designated seat even when the father is not home.  The Ben Ish Chai (Shoftim 2) rules that since this question concerns a Biblical commandment one should follow the more stringent view. This is also the view of Harav Yitzchak Yosef shlit”a in Yalkut Yosef (Kibud Av V’em page 338).

4)  If one’s father has a special chair that he occupies which is distinct from all other chairs in the house, one may not sit on that chair even if it is moved from its permanent place. (Opinions of Rav Elyashiv zt”l and Harav Ben Tzion Abba Shaul zt”l cited in Mora Horim V’Kibbudim and Pesakim Uteshuvos page 37)

5) One may stand in the place where his father sits at home. (Shach 240:1)

6) Therefore, one may stand on his father’s chair in order to reach something on a high shelf. (Pesakim Uteshuvos page 37)

7) If the parent grants permission to the child, he may occupy his place. (Aruch Hashulchan 240:9)

8) Even if one’s parents grant him permission to sit in their seat, if he refrains from sitting there he fulfills a mitzvah. (Based upon teaching of Radvaz 1:524, and Rav Akiva Eiger zt”l 240:19)

9) The prohibition to sit in one’s parents’ seat applies only during their lifetime. One is permitted to occupy their place after they pass away. (Az Nidberu 8:60 and Tzitz Eliezer 15:41:2) [There were those that refrained from sitting in the father’s seat in shul during the year of mourning. For normative halacha, a rav should be consulted.]

10) Some even add that it is an honor for the soul of the father for his son to sit in his seat after he passes away. (See Yalkut Yosef page 353)

Changing The Name of A Choleh

1) The Sages teach us that one’s Neshama and his mission in life is connected and hinted within his name. As the sefer Bris Avos (8:47), citing the Arizal, writes, “It is a mere misconception that a parent names a child arbitrarily. Rather, it is with Divine inspiration. For it is known before Him the purpose and (eventual) actions of the child, be it for the good or for the bad, all of which are concealed in his name. Each letter of the name reveals more and more about the person. Even if one finds an evil person with a name destined for the righteous, it is clear that contained in him is a small spark of goodness”.

2) The gemara (Rosh Hashana 16b) lists four methods of changing a heavenly decree that has been issued against a person. The methods listed include giving charity, crying out to God, changing one’s deeds, and changing his name. Based on this gemara, the Rema (Yoreh Deah 338:10) records the custom to change the name of a dangerously ill person in an attempt to change the decree against him and save his life. The reason that changing the name can be effective is that one is altering the choleh’s spiritual makeup and thus changing his mazal. (See Minchas Chein on Rambam Teshuva 2:4, Sefer V’Ela Shmos by Rav Yaakov Hillel shlit”a and Sefer Otzar Dinim V’Hanhagim page 428) It goes without saying that one should not change one’s name unless he spoke to a prominent posek who understands both Halacha and Kabbalah.

3) The Gemara states that one should “change” his name and indeed Harav Yaakov Hillel shlit”a (V’Ela Shmos) feels that one must entirely change his name and merely adding a name is not effective. However, the overwhelming majority of opinions maintain that one should not change the name, but rather add a name. This is especially true according to the Ari z”l that one’s Neshama is connected to one’s name, one should therefore not uproot his original name entirely. (Gesher Hachaim 1:3:4, Taamei Haminhagim page 105, Yabia Omer 5 Y.D. 21:3 and Dvar Moshe Teumim 48)

4) The Lubavitcher Rebbe zt”l (Shaarei Halacha U’Minhag vol. 3 page 3oo) writes that since the name of a person is the “spiritual pipeline” connecting the soul to the body one should not add a name unless it is extremely necessary”. The Sefer chassidim (245) rules that one may only change the name for a choleh who is in a life threatening situation. Once again, one should only alter the name after consulting a competent Halachis authority.

5) The new name should be added before the original name. For example if his name is Moshe and the are adding the name Refael, his name become Refael Moshe and not Moshe Refael. (Gesher Hachaim 1 page 31)

6) If one recovers from the illness for 30 days his additional name remains with him for the rest of his life (for aliyos, kesubos etc.). If, however, he did not recover for 30 days his additional name is not used on his tombstone. (Gesher Hachaim ibid.)

7) The Chida (Sefer D’vash Lefi) writes that when adding a name for a woman, one should not add the names Rachel, Batsheva, Tamar, or Leah, but should instead choose Chanah, Sarah, or Yocheved.

8) The poskim debate whether a person needs to re-write the Kesubah after his name is added. According to Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l a new Kesubah is needed, while according to Harav Elyashiv zt”l and Harav Wosner zt”l one need not write a second Kesubah. (See Hanisuin K’Hilchosom page 357 and Shevet Halevi 8:286)

Interruptions While Making A Bracha

1) When a person makes a bracha, he is required to eat or drink some of the food immediately. (S.A. 167:6) One may not speak until some of the food is swallowed. (M.B. 35)
2) If one did speak (about something unnecessary to the eating) before taking the first bite his bracha is not valid and a second bracha is required. (S.A.)
3) The Mishnah Berurah writes that if one first put some food in his mouth, started chewing it, and then spoke before swallowing it it is questionable whether the bracha is valid. It seems that his conclusion is that b’dieved the bracha is valid. However, it is important for people to avoid this issue and only speak after swallowing some of the food. (See V’Zos Habracha page 14)
4) The poskim explain that one should not make an interruption even if one does not recite any words. For example, if one wishes to instruct a family member to be quiet, he should not say “shh” or “nu” after reciting the bracha before swallowing some of the food. (See V’Zos Habracha page 16 and V’Sein Bracha page 46)
5) Similarly, one should not hum a tune after the bracha before eating the food. (Minchas Yitzchak 7:9 and Shevet Halevi 5:16. See, however, Halichos Chaim page 62 for a more lenient view) This is very common on Shabbos after the bracha of Hamotzi before eating the challah, one should not hum a tune. If one did hum a tune another bracha is not recited. (Shevet Halevi ibid.)

The Prayer Of Brich Shmei [בריך שמיה]

1) Whenever the Torah is taken out to be read, the  Aramaic prayer of Brich Shmei [בריך שמיה] is recited as it is removed from the Aron Kodesh.
2) There are different opinions when one should recite the prayer:
A- According to Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe 4:70) and ybc”l Rav Chaim Kanievsky shlit”a (Halichos Chaim page 56) one should remove the Torah and then recite Brich Shmei. [Rav Moshe does point out that one should not rebuke those that act not according to this view.]
B- The Minchas Elazar of Munkatch (Darchei Chaim V’Shalom 196) would recite the entire Brich Shmei and only then remove the Sefer Torah. This is also the custom of Sefardim (see V’Zarach Hashemesh page 9).
C- According to Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Halichos Shlomo page 144) held that one may recite it either before or after the Torah is removed. Either way is fine.
D- Rav Sarya Dblitzky shlit”a (V’Zarach Hashemesh page 9) writes that in his shul the custom is to begin reciting it with the Torah still in the Aron and to take the Torah out during the recitation of Brich Shmei.
3) In either event, one may continue reciting Brich Shmei while the Torah is being carried until the Torah is opened and ready to be read. (M.B. 134:13)