Issurim

How Far Must We Go To Save Another Person’s Life

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

1. The Torah commands us not to stand idly by while someone’s blood is being spilled (Lo Saamod Al Dam Re’acha). We must therefore do everything in our power to save another Jew from a life threatening situation. If one is able to save another person and does not he has transgressed this commandment. (Rambam Rotzeach 1:14)

2. However, there is also a ruling of Chayecha Kodem, which teaches that your life takes precedence and therefore one is not allowed to place one’s self in a life threatening situation to spare another from a life threatening situation.One can not commit suicide or place himself in peril in order to save another person.

3. The question that the poskim deal with is whether one is required to enter a potentially life threatening situation (Safek Sakana) in order to save another Jew from an absolute life threatening situation. For example a man is drowning and if no one jumps in to save him he will die. However, the torrent is pretty strong and it is possible that the person jumping in may be in danger himself of drowning. The question is is he allowed or required to jump in the water?
4. Harav Yosef Karo zt”l, in his Sefer Kesef Mishnah, cites the Hagahos Maimon who rules in accordance with the Yerushalmi that one is required to place himself in a Safek Sakana in order to save another Jew from an absolute life threatening situation. He explains that because the other person will definitely die and the rescuer will only potentially die, we worry about the definite and not the potential. This was also the view of the Tiferes Yisroel (Peah 1:5).

5. The Kesef Mishnah and Hagahos Maimon do not tell us where in the Yerushalmi can this ruling be found. The Netziv (Emek Sheala Shelach) explains that they are referring tot the Yerushalmi in Meseches Terumos which records that Rav Imi was captured by robbers and was in a life threatening situation. Rav Yonasan said that there is nothing we can do and we must accept his untimely fate. However, Reish Lakish said, “I am going to rescue him and either I will kill them (the captors) or they will kill me.” Reish Lakish actively placed himself in potential danger in order to save his friend and this is the source of the ruling of the Hagahos Maimon.

6. Harav Yoel Serkes zt”l, in his commentary on Shulchan Aruch (Sma Choshen Mishpat 426), noted that the Rama and Shulchan Aruch both omit this ruling from their writings. It is in no doubt due to the fact that the pillars of halacha, the Rosh, Rif, and Rambam, all omitted the ruling of the Yerushalmi. It also seems that Rabbeinu Yona, in his Sefer Issur V’Heter (59:38), disagrees with the Hagahos Maimon and rules that one is not required to enter a potentially dangerous situation in order to save a person in life threatening danger. The Mishnah Berurah (329:19) also rules that one is not required to endanger himself in order to save another.

7. The Aruch Hashulchan (429:4) explains that the reason all these Rishonim do not rule in accordance with the Yerushalmi is that the Talmud Bavli disagrees with the Yerushalmi. He does not, however, include a source from the Bavli that would imply or convey a view different from that of the Yerushalmi. See the Tzitz Eliezer (9:45) who cites potential sources from the Bavli that seem to disagree with the Yerushalmi.

8. The Radvaz (shu”t 3:626) feels that according to the vast majority of opinions, who do not require one to endanger himself in order to save another person, not only is one not required to do so, one is not allowed to do so. He writes that one who places himself in Safek Sakana in order to save his friend is a “foolishly pious individual” and the potential risk out ways the mortal danger facing his friend. One is not allowed to endanger himself in order to perform a Mitzvah or in order to avoid a sin (except idolatry, murder, and sexual relations). Therefore, it is not permitted to endanger one’s self in order to avoid performing the sin of Lo Saamod Al Dam Re’acha. This ruling was also cited by Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l (Minchas Yitzchak 6:103).

9. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe Yoreh Deah 2:174) disagrees with the ruling of the Radvaz. He explains that although normally one may not endanger himself in order to avoid a sin, in this case one is permitted since his actions will lead to a Jewish person being saved. According to Harav Moshe zt”l the whole debate is whether one is required to enter a Safek Sakana in order to save his friend. However, everyone agrees that one is permitted to do so.

10. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yechava Daas 3:84) found a discrepancy in the writings of the Radvaz. In one response the Radvaz (ibid.) writes that one is not permitted to endanger himself in order to save his friend. While in another response (2:218) he writes that one is required to enter a somewhat dangerous situation in order to save someone from a life threatening situation. Harav Yosef zt”l explains that there is no contradiction. If there is a 50%, or more, chance of death one is not allowed to save his friend. It is not allowed to perform an act with such a high risk of death, even in order to save his friend. If the chance of death is less than 50% one is required to save his friend. In this case the chance of death is so small that the reward of saving a Jew out ways the potential danger. He adds that the Radvaz, himself, seems to indicate such a distinction in one of the responses.

11. The Radvaz (3:626) does add that there is no requirement to donate a limb in order to save another jew, even if donating a limb involves a small (less than 50%) risk of death. He explains that the ways of the Torah are sweet and the Torah would never require someone to become mutilated and deformed. What if donating eyes could save a life, reasons the Radvaz, you would have half of Klal Yisroel missing eyes? The Torah cannot require such a thing. Although it is praiseworthy to donate a limb, the Torah would never require organ donation.

12. A soldier in war time may not be bound by the previous discussion and it is possible that a soldier may place himself in danger in order to save others. For normative halacha, a rabbi should be consulted.

If you have a question, comment, or an idea for an article please email  me at avizakutinsky@gmail.com.

Using Secular Dates In Halacha

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)
1. The poskim stress the importance of using the Jewish calendar for calculating years (ex. 5774), as apposed to using the Gregorian calendar (ex. 2014). The Chasam Sofer (Drashos Chasam Sofer 7 Av year 5570) writes that by counting our years back from the creation of the world we are reminding ourselves of our Creator and of our divine rights to Eretz Yisroel.
2. It is generally assumed that the calendar system currently in use dates back to the birth of Yeshu Hanotzri. Therefore using this calendar system may not be hallachically permitted. The Maharam Shick strongly objected to using secular dates on tombstones. He explains that the Torah says (Shemos 23:13) that we may not mention the names of other gods. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 63b) understands this prohibition to include one who tells his friend to meet him near a particular avodah zara.

The Maharam Shick (Yoreh Deah 171), in turn, extends this prohibition to any action that would cause people to think about avodah zara, even without mentioning it by name. Therefore, he argues, since the secular calendar year is counted from the birth of Yeshu, it is biblically prohibited to use the secular calendar year. A similar stringent ruling is expressed by other poskim (see Sefer Get Pashut 127:30, Hillel Omer Yoreh Deah 62, Yayin Hatom Orach Chaim 8,Beer Moshe 8:18).

3. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yabia Omer Yoreh Deah 3:9), however, proves that there exists a very strong possibility that the secular dates do not correspond at all to the birth of Yeshu Hanotzri. He argues that if the dates have nothing to do with the birth of Yeshu Hanotzri, there would be no hallachic issue with the secular date.

4. Some object to this leniency on the grounds that as long as people think the date relates to avodah zara, they will be reminded of the avodah zara, and one will then violate a Torah prohibition by bringing the avodah zara to people’s attention (Beer Moshe ibid. This is also the view of Harav Nosson Gestetner zt”l printed in Tzitz Eliezer 9:14).

5. The Tzitz Eliezer addresses this objection and explains that if the date really has no relevance to the avodah zara, and people only mistakenly equate the two, there would be no prohibition in using the secular date. One is not responsible for the thoughts of others and as long as he does not mention the avodah zara, or something related to the avodah zara, he has not transgressed any prohibition. In addition, most people are not reminded of Yeshu Hanotzri when told the date. Therefore, he rules leniently and allows others to use the secular date.

6. The Sefer Yereim(75) writes that, “There is no prohibition (of mentioning avodah zara) except when the name is given as a divine name that suggests divinity. But if it is a secular name, then even if this being is treated as a god, since the name does not suggest lordship or divinity, and it also was not given in that context, then it is permitted. For the Torah says, ‘The name of other gods you shall not mention’ – the verse is only concerned with divine names.” According to the Yereim one would be permitted to utter the name of Yeshu outright, and therefore there should be no prohibition of reminding others of his name, so long as one does not reference any “godly characteristics” of Yeshu. (Harav Azriel Hidsheimer zt”l (Yoreh Deah 180) writes, that even if the position of the Yereim is granted, this would certainly not extend to the second part of Yeshu’s title [beginning with the letter “c”], which definitely suggests a “divine status.”)

7. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l continues to cite that many achronim, including the Shach, Chasam Sofer, and Maharm Padwa, have dated letters using the secular dates.
Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l and Harav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg zt”l both conclude that when necessary, it is permissible to use the secular date. When possible, however, one should try to use the Jewish year. Furthermore, it would seem that one who uses both the Jewish and Gregorian years next to each other is clearly indicating that the Jewish date is meaningful to him, and that he is only using the secular dates for practical reasons.

8. In addition to the issue of counting the years according to the secular calendar, there is an additional debate regarding the best way to identify the secular months when writing invitations. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l cites the Ramban who stresses the importance of counting months according to the Jewish calendar. When the Torah says that Nissan is the first month of the year, it is implying that one may not consider any other month to be the “first.” Therefore, Harav Ovadia concludes, that when writing the secular months one should not refer to them by number, but by name. For example, one should write January, 12, 2014 and not 1,12,2014 (see also Tzitz Eliezer 8:8, 9:14 and Teshuvos V’Hanhagos 1:850).

A similar ruling is expressed by Harav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt”l (Shalmei Simcha page 687). Harav Moshe Shternbuch shlit”a, however, writes that it is permitted to count the secular months by number (Teshuvos V’Hanhagos 1:830).

9. The Tzitz Eliezer disagrees with the ruling of Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l. He writes that because the months are named after gentile gods, one may not mention the names by name, but should instead refer to them by number (see also Orchos Rabbeinu page 231).

10. Harav Hershel Schachter shlit”a, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivas Rabbeinu Yitzchak Elchonon, in a letter addressed to the author, writes that he feels that it is preferable to write the name of the month than to reference it by number. Harav Noach Isaac Oelbaum shlit”a, in a letter addressed to the author, explains that it is difficult to advance a clear hallachic ruling. However, he personally adheres to the view of Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l and references the secular months by name and not by number.

[Hashevaynu’s Sunday Night Madness at Dave and Buster’s will take place on December 7th, for all information please go to hashevaynu.org]

If you have a question, comment, or an idea for an article please email  me at avizakutinsky@gmail.com.

The Mitzvah Tantz (Part 2)

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

Who Dances-

1. Father- The Sefer Mor V’Ohalos (page 82b) maintains that the father of the kallah may dance with his daughter without using the gartel. He explains that many poskim rule that a father may have physical contact with his daughter and so the use of the gartel is rendered unnecessary.

This was also the view of Harav Moshe Stern zt”l. He adds that many great rabbis also followed this practice (shu”t Beer Moshe 4:132). Harav Gavriel Zinner shlit”a (Netai Gavriel Nisuin page 272) writes that the author of the Sefer Kol Aryeh, the Minchas Elazar of Munkatch, the Vayaged Moshe of Pupa, the Rebbe of Kasson, the Imrei Chaim of Vizhnitz, and the Ahavas Yisroel of Vizhnitz all danced with their daughters without a gartel.
2. Harav Zinner shlit”a continues that the leaders of Chernobyl, Nadvorna and Bobov all had the custom to dance with their daughters using a gartel.

3. Harav Yosef Greenwald zt”l and Harav Yekusiel Yehudah Halberstam zt”l would dance before their daughters without holding a gartel.

4. The father of the chosson is not allowed to have physical contact with his daughter in law and must, at the very least, use a gartel.

5. Grandfather- The Beis Shmuel (Even Haezer 21:14) cites the Chelkas Mechokek and the Bach who both permit a grandfather to have physical contact with his granddaughter. He does note, however, that the Ran seems to rule stringently. While the Beis Shmuel attempts to find a source for the lenient view, it is unclear whether he rules leniently for normative halacha.

Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe Even Haezer 4:63) writes that it appears to him that the Beis Shmuel also allows for a grandfather to have contact with his granddaughter. One can argue that according to the Bach, Beis Shmuel, and the Chelkas Mechokek a grandfather can perform the mitzvah tantz without the use of a gartel.

6. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l, in his first volume of Igros Moshe Even Haezer (60), explains that there may be a distinction between a paternal granddaughter (his son’s daughter) and a maternal granddaughter (his daughter’s daughter). There is more room to be lenient with a maternal granddaughter, than a paternal granddaughter. He explains that the daughter is an extension of her mother and any contact with the daughter will remind the person of her mother. Therefore, physical contact with a maternal granddaughter is permitted because it will only remind the father of his daughter, who he is also permitted to touch. However, a paternal granddaughter will remind him of his daughter in law, a woman with whom he may not have any contact. He concludes that while one should be machmir and not have contact with his paternal granddaughter, one should not rebuke those who rule leniently. Yet, in the fourth volume of Even Haezer (ibid.) he notes that the common custom is to permit contact with both forms of granddaughters. (see also Shevet Halevi 5:198)

7. Harav Moshe Stern zt”l (shu”t Beer Moshe 4:133) was asked whether a grandfather may perform the mitzvah tantz with his granddaughter. He writes that one would only be permitted to do so with the use of a gartel. He explains that the aforementioned poskim, who permit physical contact between a granddaughter and grandfather, only allowed this in private. In public one should refrain from all physical contact so as to not lead others to become lenient in these areas of halacha.

8. All other relatives of the kallah may not dance with the kallah without the use of the gartel.

9. The chosson- Harav Gavriel Zinner shlit”a writes that many have the custom that the chosson dances with the kallah without the use of a gartel. He continues to cite the custom among Nadvorna Chassidim that the chosson uses a gartel when dancing with the kallah. The Lubavitcher Rebbe zt”l told Harav Zinner that he has never heard of the custom of the chosson and kallah dancing together without the use of a gartel.

10. Harav Dovid Harfenes (Vayivarech David page 279) warns that care should be taken that no one else dance with the chosson and kallah. In addition, no men should watch them dance.

11. The custom among many Chassidic sects, (Belz, Sanz, Square, Vizhnitz and Amshinov), is that single men are not present during the mitzvah tantz. It goes without saying that a single man should not participate in the mitzvah tantz (Netai Gavriel ibid. See also shu”t Mishneh Halachos 7:249).

Assorted Hallachos-

12. It is customary for badchanim to rejoice with the chosson and kallah during the mitzvah tantz. The badchan also calls up each person to dance with the kallah (Hanisuin Kesidram chapter 21).

13. Some give charity before dancing with the kallah (Netai Gavriel chapter 45:8).

14. During the dance there is a custom to announce the words “Shabbos Shabbos.” (Sefer Mataamim Chosson V’Kallah 115)

15. Harav Dovid Harfenes rules that there is a need for a mechitzah during the mitzvah tantz. This way no other men can see the kallah dance. He explains that while in earlier seforim it says that there is no need for a mechitzah due to the immense holiness of the mitzvah tantz, unfortunately, the times have changed and there is a need to place boundaries to protect those present from sin (Vayivarech David Nisuin 96).

Harav Meir Brandosdorfer zt”l and Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l also feel that there should be a mechitzah separating the men and the women during the mitzvah tantz. The mechitzah should be placed in such a way that the men cannot see the women but the women can still see the kallah dancing (see shu”t Koneh Bosem 2:108).

16. The Tzaddikim of Nadvorna, Vizhnitz and Square all had the custom for the kallah to wear her veil during the mitzvah tantz (Netai Gavriel ibid.).

17. The chosson does not perform the mitzvah tantz with the kallah when she is a nidah (Taharas Yisroel 192:35), even with the use of a gartel (Netai Gavriel page 283).

[Hashevaynu’s Sunday Night Madness at Dave and Buster’s will take place on December 7th, for all information please go to hashevaynu.org]

If you have a question, comment, or an idea for an article please email  me at avizakutinsky@gmail.com.

The Mitzvah Tantz (Part 1)

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

1. Few customs in Judaism are as debated as the mitzvah tantz. The mitzvah tantz. or mitzvah dance, is the chassidic custom of honorable men (related to the chosson or kallah) dancing before the bride, after the wedding feast. Commonly, the bride, who usually stands perfectly still at one end of the room, will hold one end of a gartel, while the one dancing before her holds the other end. Many consider this to be a very special and holy practice, while others feel that this practice should not be performed, as shall be explained (see Shulchan Haezer vol. 2 page 79b).
2. The Gemara makes reference to “dancing before the kallah.” The Machzor Vitri (496) writes that, “Following the meal we take the chosson and kallah and we seat them facing each other. We then dance around them etc.” Some point to the Machzor Vitri as the source for the mitzvah tantz, even though he makes no reference of dancing with the kallah, which is usually the case with the mitzvah tantz.

3. Many chassidic seforim explain that the mitzvah tantz carries great spiritual importance (see Sefer Derech Pekudecha Mitzvah Lo Saaseh 35:14, Sefer Avnei Esaser and Sefer Netai Gavriel Nisuin chapter 45).

4. The Sefer Shulchan Haezer (vol. 2 page 80) illustrates the importance of this custom from the following story. Grand Rabbi Moshe Hager of Kosov zt”l was once approached by a very poor kallah a few days before her wedding. She wished to receive charity from the Rebbe. The Rebbe gave her money and said that due to his age and the arduous trip he will not be able to attend the wedding. However, he does wish to perform the great mitzvah of dancing before the kallah. So he donned his Shabbos clothing and performed the mitzvah tantz.

5. The Pischei Teshuva (Even Haezer 65:2), however, cites the Sefer Torah Chaim who prohibits dancing with the kallah, even if a gartel is used and no physical contact is made with the kallah. He adds that the Gemara discusses the virtue of dancing “before” the kallah, not “with” the kallah.

Based upon this teaching, Harav Moshe Stern zt”l (shu”t Beer Moshe 4:131) writes that he performs a modified version of mitzvah tantz. He dances before the kallah without holding a gartel. This was also the practice of the great Rebbe of Shinova zt”l (see Sefer Divrei Torah Munkatch vol. 1 note 6), Harav Yosef Greenwald (Pupa Rav) and Harav Yekusiel Yehudah Halberstam zt”l (see Netai Gavriel 45:3).

6. Those who do use a gartel during the mitzvah tantz feel that since the man is not touching the woman (or her clothing), but rather he is touching the same thing that she is touching, there is no prohibition. Even though normally this is not something that one would do (as it may be prohibited for a husband to act this way with his wife when she is a nidah- see Shach Yoreh Deah 195:2), for the sake of the mitzvah of simchas chosson v’kallah it is permitted (see Shulchan Haezer ibid.).

Moreover, the kallah does not really “dance.” She merely holds on to the gartel as the man dances. This way they are really dancing  “before” the kallah and not “with” her (Shu”t Vayivarech David Nisuin page 278).

7. Ashkenazim and sefardim do not have the custom to perform the mitzvah tantz. Chabad Chassidim also do not have the custom to perform the mitzvah tantz (see Netai Gavriel ibid.).

8. The Bach (Even Haezer 21) writes that if one has the custom to perform the mitzvah tantz he may continue to do so. If he does not have such a custom, then one may not decide to perform the mitzvah tantz. This ruling was cited by the Chelkas Mechokek and Beis Shmuel as normative halacha.

Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l also rules that sefardim, who do not have the custom of the mitzvah tantz, should not perform the mitzvah tantz (Yalkut Yosef Sovea Semachos page 197).

If you have a question, comment, or an idea for an article please email  me at avizakutinsky@gmail.com.

Dancing on Shabbos

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

1. Fixing an instrument on Yom Tov and Shabbos is a biblical violation of the melacha of maka b’patish. The use of instruments on Yom Tov and Shabbos is also forbidden because chazal was concerned that if one of the instruments would break, one might come to fix it.

2, The Mishna in Beitza (36b) rules that it is forbidden to clap one’s hands, bang on one’s thighs, or dance on Yom Tov and Shabbos. Since dancing and clapping were generally done to the accompaniment of musical instruments, these actions were forbidden as well. This law is codified by the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 23:5) and the Shulchan Aruch (339:3).
3. Tosafos argues that clapping and dancing should be permitted given that the concern which led to the decree is no longer relevant. He feels that since nowadays very few people are skilled in instrument repair, there is little reason to fear that someone would come to repair an instrument which had broken. The view of Tosafos is cited by the Rama.

However, the poskim do not fully concur with the lenient view of Tosafos, for reasons beyond the scope of this article (see Shu”t Yechave Daas 2:58 and Shu”t Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld 194).

4. The Toras Shabbos (139:2), based on the Yerushalmi, defines dancing as the action when one picks up his first foot, and before it fully returns to the ground, the second foot has already begun to rise. Simply moving around in a circle would be permitted (see also the Agudah on Beitzah and Yechava Daas ibid.). [See also the Aruch Hashulchan and Shu”t Lev Avraham 42 for an additional reason to rule leniently]

5. In many chassidic circles the custom is to permit dancing on Shabbos and Yom Tov. The Minchas Elazer (1:29) explains that dancing and singing is permitted for those who are engrossed in the simcha of Shabbos, since for them it is considered a mitzvah. There are, however, many poskim who have raised issues with the ruling of the Minchas Elazar (Yechava Daas, this is especially so according to the opinions [that we will cite shortly] who forbid dancing even with the chosson during his aufruf , which is a Mitzvah).

6. While the custom among many Chassidic circles is to permit dancing on Shabbos and Yom Tov, the custom for the majority of Jews is to be stringent (see Igros Moshe 2:100).

7. Many poskim prohibit dancing with the chosson during the aufruf. The Mishnah Berurah (339:8) only permits dancing on Simchas Torah where clapping and dancing is a mitzvah, as it is a form of honor for the Torah. However, for any other reason, such as for an aufruf, it would not be permissible. This is also the view of the Shulchan Aruch Harav (339:2) and the Kaf Hachaim (339:13).

8. However, the Chavos Yair (Mekor Chaim 511:1), Rav Chaim Palag’i (Lev Chaim 2:9), Rav Avraham Wahrman Rav of Butchetch (Eishel Avraham 339:3), and Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Shalmei Simcha page 115) all permit dancing during the aufruf.The Chazon Ish is also cited as saying that the custom is rule leniently (Maaseh Haish vol. 5 page 17).

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Chanifa- Flattery in Halacha

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

“And you shall not corrupt the land in which you live, for the blood corrupts the land, and the blood which is shed in the land cannot be atoned for except through the blood of the one who shed it”. (Masai 35:33)

The Sifra writes that the above verse is the source to prohibit flattery or appeasement (chanifa). The Sefer Yeraim (248) explains that the proper definition of chanifa is perverting the truth by “flattering” someone who is doing something hallachically wrong. Any time we choose to let a sinner think his sinful act is, for some reason, not so bad- we are guilty of chanifa. Chanifa likewise occurs when a Jewish person gives a false picture of what the Torah says. The Orchos Tzadikim lists nine forms of chanifa, one of which is bestowing honor upon a rasha.

Chanifa in the Talmud

In Sota (41a) the Mishna relates an episode that took place shortly before the destruction of the second Temple, during the reign of King Agrippas, a grandchild of King Herod. During the mitzvah of “Hakhel”, which took place once every seven years, the King read aloud from the Torah in the Temple courtyard, in the presence of all the people. When he reached the verse (Devarim 17) “You [the Jewish people] may not appoint over yourselves [as king] a foreigner”, King Agrippas began to weep (for this verse disqualifies him from being the king). Whereupon the Rabbis and the people comforted him, saying, “You are our brother, you are our brother.” The Gemara comments that at that instant the Jewish people became guilty of destruction for flattering King Agrippas.

The Gemara continues to list the severity of this prohibition, it says that any person who flatters, even the unborn curse him; any group which flatters will ultimately be exiled; whoever has in him flattery will fall to Gehennom etc.

Chanifa to save one’s life

Tosafos (Sotah 41b) writes that although chanifa is forbidden, one may do so in life threatening situations. His source is a Gemara Nedarim Daf 22. The Gemara records that Ulla, while traveling to Israel with two men, witnessed one man murder the other. The murderer then turned to Ulla and asked, “was I correct in my actions?”. Ulla, fearing for his life, responded “Yes”. When Ulla encountered Rav Yochanan he voiced his concern that perhaps he was aiding the actions of a sinner, Rav Yochanan responded that “you were allowed to do so to save your life.” Tosafos cites this Gemara as the source that chanifa is permitted to save one’s own life. A similar view was expressed by the Yeraim (248). The Mishnah Berurah (156:4) codifies this ruling as well, he writes: “If one fears for his life he is allowed to tell someone ‘you have done well’, even if that person committed a sin.”

However, Rabbeinu Yonah (in Shaarei Teshuva shaar shlishi 188) disagrees and feels that one is obligated to give up one’s life rather than commit chanifa. The Sefer Orchos Tzadikim follows the approach of the Shaarei Teshuva.

The opinion of Rabbeinu Yona is seemingly problematic, for there are only three aveirus that one is obligated to die rather than commit. Those three sins are murder, idolatry and illicit relations. And since chanifa is not one of the three sins one should perform this act rather than lose his life.

I believe the answer to this question can be found in the works of Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe O.C. 2:51). Rav Moshe discusses the prohibition of chanifa and its parameters. He cites the permissible view of Tosafos and his source- the Gemara Nedarim. Rav Moshe wonders why does Tosafos need to find an obscure Gemara to rule leniently, since chanifa is not one of the three grave sins (which we require one to give up his life), it should need no source or proof to allow it? Rav Moshe explains that normally one should perform chanifa in life threatening situations, this is a clear and simple fact. However, there are situations where one is not allowed to transgress that sin and that is if it entails advancing an erroneous hallachic ruling. As the Yam Shel Shlomo (Baba Kama 38) writes, one is obligated to die rather than rule incorrectly on purpose. When one does so he is questioning the validity of the Torah and the rules found therein.

Rav Moshe explains that Tosafos feels that saying to a rasha when he sins that “he acted correctly” is not considered issuing a hallachic ruling (rather he is saying that people who have your low moral compass would feel that you acted correctly) and is allowed to save his life.  Tosafos needed the Gemara in Nedarim as a source that telling someone “you have acted correctly” is not considered a hallachic ruling. However, to issue an erroneous ruling, such as “One is permitted to commit murder” is absolutely forbidden and one should die rather than issue such a ruling.

[He adds that the biblical prohibition of chanifa may only apply to one who perverts the truth by validating a sinful act, such as “you have done correctly”, however, merely bestowing honor upon a rasha may not be considered Biblical chanifa. Although bestowing honor upon a rasha may be considered a negative action and should be avoided, in great need one may rule leniently.]

Now we can perhaps understand the ruling of Rabbeinu Yona. It is possible that he was discussing whether one may tell a sinner “you have acted correctly” to save his life, to which Rabbeinu Yona rules that one is forbidden to do so. And the reason that Rabbeinu Yone feels that one is not allowed to do so is because he disagrees with Tosafos and feels that merely telling a sinner that he acted correctly is considered issuing an erroneous hallachic ruling and is not allowed even in life threatening situations.

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The Prohibition against Counting Jewish People

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)

“Take the sum of all the congregation of the children of Israel, by families following their fathers’ houses; a head count of every male according to the number of their names.” (Bamidbar 1:2)

The above parsha describes the detailed census of the Jews in the desert. Counting Jews directly is forbidden, as the Rambam writes (Tamid 4:4) that it is prohibited to conduct a census and to count the Jewish people. This ruling is also codified by the Magen Avraham (156:2).
Reason for the Prohibition

`What is the reason for this prohibition? Rashi (Shmos 30:12) writes that the reason we refrain from counting Jews is because one who conducts a census is in danger of afflicting a plague upon those who were counted. The Anaf Yosef (Yoma 22a) explains that counting individuals creates a possibility that they will be judged in the Heavenly court. He adds that this judgement has the potential for having devastating effects, more so than any other judgement, because usually G-d in His infinite kindness judges the Jewish people as a whole, rather than individually. This insures that even if an individual is not acting righteous, as long as the “klal” (the Jewish nation) is considered righteous, the individual will be judged as a tzaddik. However, when they are counted as individuals, Jews become “separated” and are subject to individual scrutiny.

Sources for the Prohibition

There are primarily three sources for this issur; one from the Torah and two are found in the Navi:

1) In Sefer Shmos (30:12), Moshe Rabbeinu is commanded to count the Children of Israel by collecting a half-shekel from each person in order so “there will be no plague among them when they are counted.” As explained above, Rashi writes that the rationale for the prohibition against census-taking is due to fear of the “evil eye” (Ayin Hara) and a plague. Indeed, the Gemara in Brachos (62b) writes that Hashem told David Hamelech that He will make David stumble over a matter that “school children” know, namely, that it is prohibited to count Jews. Here the Gemara declares that even “school children” are aware of the prohibition of counting the Jewish people. [The Gemara is referring to the census that Dovid Hamelech conducted which led to the death of 70,000 Jewish people (See Shmuel 2 chapter 24).]

2) The Mishna in Yoma (22a) outlines the procedures used to determine which Kohen is awarded the privilege of performing the mitzvah of separating the ash from the Alter in the Bais Hamikdash. The Mishna explains that in the event that there were too many Kohanim who wished to fulfill this mitzvah, they would race to the top of the Alter to determine who would do the avodah. If it resulted in a tie then the Temple administrator would count the kohanim by counting their fingers. The Gemara (22b) writes that the fact that the fingers are counted and not the kohanim themselves supports the teaching of R’ Yitzchak. As R’ Yitzchak taught, it is forbidden to count the children of Israel through a head count, even for the purpose of a mitzvah. For it is written (Shmuel 1, 11:8), in reference to the count that Shaul Hamelech made of his soldiers, “He counted them through the pottery shards”.

3) The Gemara continues to cite the opinion of R’ Elazar that whoever counts the people of Israel transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated: “The Number of the Children of Israel will be like the sand of the sea, which cannot be counted”. And Rav Nachman Bar Yitzchak writes, that he transgresses two negative commandments, for it is stated in that verse “which cannot be (1) measured or (2) counted”.

Is the prohibition Biblical?

It would seem that the prohibition to conduct a census is Biblical in nature as the first source cited above is a posuk in the Torah. Rashi seems to feel this way and therefore explains that Moshe Rabbeinu was commanded to count the half-shekels and not the people themselves. The sefer Beer Sheva also states that the issur is from the Torah and therefore wonders why the Rambam, Chinuch and other Rishonim who list all the 613 mitzvos, do not count the prohibition of counting the Children of Israel as one of the negative commandments.

Contrastingly, Rav Yeruchem Fishel Perlow zt”l (Sefer Hamitzvos Lerasag vol. 2, mitzvah 264-265) explains that according to Rav Saadia Gaon and the Tashbetz the prohibition is actually Rabbinic. He explains that Moshe Rabbeinu was allowed to count the Children of Israel as long as they donate a half-shekel to protect themselves from plague. On a Biblical level there is no issur of counting Jews as long as they donate a half-shekel to the Bais Hamikdash after the count. The sole prohibition exists from Navi (Shaul Hamelech) and is Rabbinic in nature.

Conducting an unnecessary census

As cited above the Gemara in Yoma prohibits counting the Children of Israel even for the sake of the mitzvah. However, one is permitted to count them in an indirect way such as counting their fingers. Tosafos Rid (Yoma 22b) writes that it is only permitted to do so for the sake of a mitzvah. However, conducting an unnecessary census is forbidden even if the method of counting is done indirectly. A similar view is expressed by the Chida (Sefer Pesach Ainayim on Yoma).

Counting part of Klal Yisroel

Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi zt”l introduces a novel ruling. He feels that one can only transgress the prohibition by counting all of Klal Yisroel. However, it is permitted to count a part of Klal Yisroel.

The opinion of the Mizrachi is seemingly problematic. In the case of Shaul Hamelech, he did not wish to count all of the nation but rather just his soldiers, and yet he did not count them directly, rather he counted pottery shards in their place. It is thus clear that there exists a prohibition to count even a small fraction of Jews. In addition David Hamelech did not count the tribes of Binyamin and Levi and he was still punished as if he counted all of Klal Yisroel. Even more still, the Kohanim in the Bais Hamikdash were not counted directly even though they were only a margin of the Jewish population. See, however, Yabia Omer C.M. 10:2 where Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l cites many authorities who attempt to explain the opinion of the Mizrachi.

Assorted Hallachos

1) The Kaf Hachaim (13:10) writes that one is permitted to count Jewish People in one’s mind (b’machshava), as long as he does not count them audibly.

2) Chasam Sofer (cited by his son the Ksav Sofer Y.D. 106) is of the opinion that it is assur to count written names as if it were done so orally. However, the Ralbag (cited by Rav Ovadia Yosef zt”l in Shu”t Yabia Omer vol. 10 C.M. 2) writes that counting written names is permissible.

3) When counting ten men for a minyan, it is customary to use a Torah verse that contains ten words instead of using numbers. The verse usually used is: “Hoshiah et amecha u’varech et nachalatecha ur’em venas’em ad ha’olam.” See Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 15:3.

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The Obligation To Wait Between Meat and Milk

(This should not be relied upon for practical halacha. When a question arises a Rabbi should be consulted.)
Introduction- Waiting after meat

There are three places where the Torah states that one should not cook meat and milk together (Shmos 23:19, 34:26 and Devarim 14:21). Chazal tell us that one verse is prohibiting cooking meat and milk together. The second verse is prohibiting eating meat and milk that was cooked together. And the final verse prohibits any enjoyment from milk and meat that was cooked together (Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 87:1).

Chazal decreed that one may not eat cheese after eating meat, but may eat meat after eating cheese. The Gemara (Chullin 105a) mentions that Mar Ukvah said that he would not eat milk and meat in the same meal; however, he would eat a dairy meal following a meat meal. The Rambam and others understand that Mar Ukveh was dictating how much time one must wait between meat and milk. And that is the amount of time between the morning meal and the evening meal. This time period is six hours. [See Biur Hagra]

There are two reasons given in the Rishonim as to the need to wait 6 hours. Rashi (Chullin 105a) explains that when one swallows meat, the fat of the meat leaves a fatty residue in the throat and the mouth for that amount of time. The Rambam (Ma’achelos Assuros 9:28) explains that some meat might get stuck in between the teeth, and for 6 hours it has the hallachic significance of meat. However, after 6 hours the stuck meat is not halachically considered meat anymore and therefore even if one would then eat dairy one would not be eating meat and dairy at the same time.

We rule stringently and are concerned for both opinions and one must wait as long as either Rashi or the Rambam would require you to do so. For example if one swallows a piece of meat whole [without chewing it] he would be required to wait 6 hours. For although the opinion of the Rambam is inapplicable (because the meat was not chewed and thus none would be stuck in between the teeth), since the opinion of Rashi is still applicable (as the meat was swallowed some of the fatty residue coats the throat) one must wait. Similarly, if one merely chews on meat, even if he did not swallow it one would still be obligated to wait 6 hours because according to the opinion of the Rambam there is a concern that some meat got stuck in between his teeth. Even though Rashi would only require a waiting period if there exists a fatty residue coating the throat which occurs only when swallowing the meat.

Six full hours

The consensus of the majority of poskim is that one must wait a full six hours (Chochmas Adam 40:13, Pischai Teshuvah 87:4, and Aruch Hashulchan 87:7). This is indeed the most prevalent custom amongst Klal Yisroel. There are those that wait only 5 hours (and a little) there custom is most probably based upon the words of the Meiri (Magen Avos page 46). The Meiri, when addressing the obligation to wait in between meat and milk writes that one must wait “five or six hours”. Rav Ahron Kotler zt”l was of the opinion that one should wait five hours and thirty one minutes (custom of Lakewood see Ohr Yitzchak Y.D. 4). He felt that as long as one has waited a majority of the sixth hour one need not wait any longer.

Three Hours

Many German Jews have the custom of waiting merely three hours. Many feel that this custom can be found in the works of Rabbeinu Yeruchem (Issur V’Heter 39). Some explain that in these communities during the short winter days, they would eat their meals 3 hours apart. (Darkei Teshuva 89:6). While others explain that in those communities they used to eat 5 meals each day, and each meal was 3 hours apart. (Rabbi Yisroel Belsky shlit”a cited in Halachically Speaking vol. 5 Issue 5).

One hour

We stated earlier that Mar Ukveh required that one cannot eat dairy and meat in the same meal and one can only eat dairy in the meal following a meat meal. We cited that many Rishonim understood that to mean one must wait the amount of time one normally waits in between meals (i.e. six hours). However, Tosafos has a different interpretation of the words of Mar Ukveh. He feels that one does not need to wait a period of time; rather the milk and meat need to be served in different meals. As long as one recited a brachah achrona and cleared the table, one would be permitted to eat dairy immediately. The Taz writes that the custom of many Dutch Jews to wait one hour is based upon the ruling of Tosafos. They feel that one need not wait at all; the requirement to wait one hour is merely a stringency they placed upon themselves.

Assorted Hallachos

1. Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:26) writs that one who swallows a meat vitamin (ex. A liver pill) does not need to wait six hours. He explains that the decree (to wait six hours) was never extended to meats that were not meant to be chewed. Additionally, since there were no pills during the time of Chazal, they were never included in the gezeira.

2. The Haflah writes that one who found meat in between his teeth and swallowed it [whether within the 6 hours or even after 6 hours from eating] would be required to wait 6 hours from that point. His opinion is cited by Rav Feivel Cohen shlit”a in the Sefer Badei Hashulchan (89:13 Tziyunim 22). See however the Chayei Halevi (5:60 note 5) for a permissible view.

3. One who eats a parave food that was cooked in meat pot (even if the pot had been used that day to cook meat), does not need to wait 6 hours (Rama 89:3).

4. If one merely tastes meat with his tongue (did not chew it) and then spits it out without swallowing it he does not need to wait 6 hours (Aruch Hashulchan YD 89:14). Washing out the mouth is still required if one wishes to eat dairy.

5. The Sefer Vyaas Avraham writes a truly novel hallacha. He feels that one who sleeps after eating meat is allowed to eat dairy immediately, even if six hours have not past. The Chasam Sofer originally agreed with this approach. The Chasam Sofer once placed milk near his bed in order that after his sleep he would be able to drink it, even though six hours had not past. However, while he was sleeping he knocked over the milk. The Chasam Sofer accepted that as a sign from Heaven that the hallacha does not concur with the Vyaas Avraham and one needs to wait six full hours even if he slept in between (See Tshuvos VHanhagos 1:43). It seems that the custom is to be stringent and not to rely upon the permissible view of the Vyaas Avraham.

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