Author: Hashevaynu

Hashevaynuhttps://halachablog.wordpress.com
Hashevaynu's avatar

Sefira and the view of the Arizal

1. According to the Arizal, haircuts are not allowed from Pesach until Erev Shavuos. It is even prohibited to do so on Lag B’Omer. (Kaf Hachaim 493:13)

2. The Minchas Elazar of Munkatch writes that weddings are permitted according to the Arizal on Lag B’Omer itself. He explains that the Arizal forbade haircuts even on Lag B’Omer not because of the mourning period, but rather for mystical reasons that would not extend to prohibit weddings. Moreover, this stringency of the Arizal regarding haircuts was not meant for the laymen, but rather only for great people. He cites testimony that the great Divrei Chaim of Sanz allows for weddings to take place on Lag B’Omer. Some even cite that the Divrei Chaim himself made his son’s wedding on Lag B’Omer.

שו”ת מנחת אלעזר ח”ד סימן ס’ שכתב: “רק לענין התספורת אין לעשות עפ”י האריז”ל גם בל”ג בעומר בסוד השערות שלא נמתק בזה עד חג שבועות וכו’ אבל לענין שאר דברים אין נוהגי’ אבילות עפ”י האריז”ל בימי ספה”ע אמנם בודאי אדרבה יום ל”ג בעומר הוא יום משתה ושמחה גדולה, וגם לענין תספורת הוא רק לגדולים ובעלי קבלה דהא האריז”ל בעצמו הלך שם עם בנו למירון לעשות תגלחתו בל”ג בעומר ועשה אותו יום משתה ושמחה כמ”ש בשעה”כ והרי גילח בעצמו את בנו א”ו דהוא רק לגדולים ועכ”פ לשארי דברים הוא יום שמחות עפ”י האריז”ל כנודע שם”.

However, the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt”l advised against making weddings on Lag B’Omer, and writes that if possible one should wait to get married after Shavuos, seemingly to adhere to the stringency of the Arizal. (Shaarei Halacha Uminhag vol. 2 page 165) A similar strict ruling is expressed by the great Rabbe Ahron of Belz zt”l. The custom of Square Chassidim is to refrain from getting married even on Lag B’Omer. (See Netai Gavriel Pesach vol. 3 page 275)

3. One who follows the custom of the Arizal and wants to change his custom should first be matir neder (annul his vow). (Kaf Hachaim 493:14)

Attending a Simcha during Sefira

1. The Gemara states that twenty four thousand students of Rabbi Akiva died during the period of Sefira, which is the time between Pesach and Shavuos. Since Talmudic times, the period of Sefira is treated as a time of mourning and the conducting of weddings is prohibited during this season.

2. There are various customs regarding which days of Sefira are to be kept as a period of mourning and are therefore not times for a wedding to take place. Many refrain from getting married from Pesach until Lag B’Omer, while others  refrain from marrying from Rosh Chodesh Iyar until three days before Shavuos (there are other customs, see Rama and Mishnah Berurah).

3. Many times a chosson and kallah will keep the first half of Sefira and wish to make their wedding after Lag B’Omer. The poskim discuss whether someone who is keeping the second half of Sefira can come and dance at a wedding taking place during their Sefira.

4. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe 159) writes that they are permitted to attend and even dance at the wedding. In addition, a rabbi can serve as the mesader kiddushin (orchestrate the wedding) even though he is still in the midst of his Sefira. He explains that the prohibition of getting married during Sefira belongs only to the chosson and kallah and when they are permitted to marry, others are permitted to attend. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l agrees with the ruling of Harav Moshe and he allows for people to attend weddings during Sefira. He himself would also travel to weddings after Lag B’Omer, even though he was still keeping Sefira. He would, however, avoid being mesader kiddushin during that time (Shalmei Simcha page 84). Harav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l (Ashrei Haish vol. 3 65:30) and Harav Yaakov Kamanetzky zt”l (Emes L’Yaakov 493) rule leniently as well.

Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l, however, in his Sefer Minchas Yitzchak (4:84), disagrees and feels that one may not attend a wedding during their Sefira, even if the chosson and kallah are not keeping Sefira. It seems that the common custom is to rule leniently in accordance with the view of Harav Moshe Feinstein

“Mezonos” Bread

During many wedding meals there is bread available for all the guests. Many caterers offer “Mezonos” bread for the occasion. This allows the guests to eat without washing and reciting Birchas Hamazon. The question is are these “Mezonos” bread really Mezonos or must we wash on these forms of bread and recite Hamotzei?

1. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 168) says, (based on the opinion of the Rambam), “if dough is kneaded with honey, milk or fruit juice, and the fruit juice is recognizable in the bread, the beracha on the bread is mezonos.” The Rama disagrees, and says such bread is still called “bread” (and the Beracha is Hamotzei) unless there is a lot of fruit juice or spices, in which case the Beracha would be mezonos. The Mishnah Berurah, as well as many other poskim, maintain that the fruit juice, etc has to be most of the mixture, and one has to actually taste it in the bread in order for the Beracha to be a mezonos.

2. The average “Mezonos” bread has a similar taste to that of regular bread. And thus according to the aforementioned poskim one would be required to wash and recite Hamotzei when eating them.

3. There is an opinion of the Daas Torah (Harav Sholom Schwadron zt”l, commonly known as the Maharsham 168:7) who maintains that if a mixture has mostly fruit juice then one does not need to taste it in the mixture. Those who recite the Blessing of Mezonos on “Mezonos” bread are relying on the opinion of the Maharsham. Since there is a lot of fruit juice in the “Mezonos” bread one need not wash on it, even if the bread is no sweeter than any other form of bread.

4. However, Harav Yisroel Belsky shlit”a (Mesorah vol. 1) writes at length that one should not rely in the opinion of the Maharsham, for numerous reasons. Firstly, many Rishonim explain that the main difference between bread dough (“hamotzi”) and cake dough (“mezonot”) is that the latter is sweeter and enjoyed far more often as a snack rather than as a meal. The fact that there is fruit juice in the dough is irrelevant if it does not affect the manner in which they are eaten. Furthermore, the Maharsham seems to imply that his ruling only applies according to the view of the Shulchan Aruch. However, according to the Rama one would still be required to taste the sweetness in the roll. Moreover, the Sefer Daas Torah was printed postmortem, accumulated from the unpublished notes and letters left over from the Maharsham. It is likely, argues Harav Belsky shlit”a, that he may not have wanted this ruling to be printed as normative Hallacha. Therefore he concludes that one must wash and recite Hamotzei on “Mezonos” bread.

5. Even those who follow the opinion that dough kneaded entirely with fruit juice automatically qualifies as “mezonos” should be aware that this refers only to 100% fruit juice. It does not include fruit juice from concentrate or a combination of pure fruit juice with some water added. (Minchas Yitzchak 9:17, opinion of Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l in Vsein Bracha)

6. In addition if one were to make an entire meal out of this bread he is required to recite Hamotzei and Birchas Hamazon. To properly elucidate how much bread is required to be eaten to be considered “a meal” is far beond the scope of this work and would require the consultation of a Rav.

7. In conclusion, some poskim feel that “Mezonos” bread is as it seems mezonos and does not require the blessing of Hamotzei and Birchas Hamazon (unless enough is eaten to be considered a meal).[The Sefer Vzos Habracha page 20 reports that this is the opinion of Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l and the rabbanim of the Badatz Eida Hachareidis. However, a different opinion of Harav Auerbach zt”l is cited in the Sefer Vsein Bracha.]

Most authorities, however, maintain that one must treat “Mezonos” bread as regular bread and one must recite Hamotzei and Birchas Hamazon. This is indeed the view of Harav Moshe Stern zt”l (the Rav of Debreczin Beer Moshe 8:37:6), Harav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l (cited in Vzos Habracha), Harav Yitzchak Liebes zt”l (Beis Avi 5:7),Harav Shmuel Wosner zt”l (cited in Vzos Habracha), ybc”l Harav Nissam Karelitz shlit”a (cited in Vzos Habracha),  Harav Yisroel Belsky shlit”a (Mesorah vol. 1), Harav Dovid Feinstein shlit”a (Vedibarta Bam page 81), Harav Rueven Feinstein shlit”a and Harav Moshe Heinemenn shlit”a.

ואעתיק כאן כרוז רבני ארצות הברית בענין לחמניות מזונות (מתורגם מאנגלית) וכמו שנדס בסוף ספר וזאת הברכה: “נהוג כיום לאפות לחמניות כאשר העיסה נילושה במיץ פירות ורשום עליהן ברכתן בורא מיני מזונות. העובדה היא שרוב בני אדם קובעים סעודה על לחמניות אלו, וכל הכוונה באפית לחמניות אלו היא לשמש תחליף לכריך גדול, הלכך אף אם דין העיסה יהיה כדין עיסה של מזונות (אשר ברוב הפעמים אינו כן), עדיין הלחמניות חייבות בנטילת ידים, המוציא וברכת המזון, מכיון שיש בהן שיעור שרוב בני אדם קובעים עליהן סעודה. הנוהג להגיש לחמניות אלה שרשום עליהן בורא מיני מזונות בארוחות כגון: חתונות, מלוה מלכה או במטוסים, כאשר כולם בודאי קובעים עליהם סעודה הוא מכשול לרבים! באנו על החתום: הרב אברהם ביק, הרב ראובן פיינשטין, הרב משה היינמן, הרב ישראל בעלסקי [ולהבדיל בין חיים לחיים] הרב משה שטערן, הרב אברהם בלומנקרנץ”.

 

Lighter Fluid and Burning The Chametz

I wanted to mention a short but important halacha related to burning the chametz.

There are two views in the Mishnah (Pesachim 21a) concerning the proper procedure for fulfilling the mitzvah of tashbisu, the Torah’s command to destroy all chometz on erev Pesach. The basic halachah is that tashbisu is accomplished by getting rid of chometz in any of the following ways: Burning it; crumbling it and throwing it to the winds; crumbling it and throwing it into an ocean or river etc. L’chatchilah, though, it has become customary to follow the view of R’ Yehudah who holds that burning in fire is the only legitimate method of getting rid of chometz (biur chometz) (Rama 445:1).

Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Halichos Shlomo page 138) mentions that it is not advisable to pour lighter fluid, gasoline or other combustible materials over the chometz before burning it, for then the chometz becomes inedible – “destroyed” – by the gasoline, etc., rather than by the fire, and as mentioned before, this should be avoided. One should therefore be careful to leave at least a cezayis of chametz (the minimum amount required to burn) untouched by lighter fluid or other chemicals. Once a cezayis of chametz is sufficiently burned one may pour lighter fluid on the remaining bread to speed up the burning process.

Pas Akum (part 4)

(Before reading this post please read Pas Akum parts 1, 2 and 3)

Jewish Participation In The Baking Process-

1. The prohibition of pas akum applies only if a non-Jew did the entire baking process. However, if a Jew contributed significantly the bread is considered pas yisroel.

2. There are three significant acts involved in the baking process: kindling the fire (or, in modern ovens, turning on the oven), placing the bread into the oven, and stoking the coals. If a Jew does any of these, the bread is considered pas yisroel. Therefore, if a non-Jew kindled the fire and placed the bread into the oven and a Jew merely stoked the coals once, the bread is pas yisroel. Nowadays, if a Jew were to turn off the oven before the bread is fully baked and turn it on again, the bread is pas yisroel.

3. As noted above, if a non-Jew lights a fire and places dough onto the fire and a Jew stokes tha coals then the bread is pas yisroel. The Rambam explains that stoking the coals is sufficient because it serves as a indicator that this fire could not be used to cook food for Jews without a Jew’s participation. He therefore rules that since a indicator is all that is required and not that the Jew actually contribute to the cooking of the food, any minimal heker including “throwing a toothpick” into the fire would suffice. The Rosh argues that there is no indication in the Gemara that such a minimal participation is acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with the Rambam.

4. According to the Pri Chadash (18) one may l’chatchila rely on the opinion of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch and throw a toothpick in the fire. However, the Aruch Hashulchan (27) maintains that one should only rely on throwing in a toothpick in a case of absolute necessity. Rather, one who wishes to prevent pas akum should initially do one of the three more significant acts (kindling the oven, placing the bread into the oven, or stoking the coals). In modern terms, in this author’s view, if one only slightly raises the flame or temperature of the oven it is similar to “throwing a toothpick” in the fire. However, if one raises the fire a significant amount it is similar to stoking the coals. (See also Chelkas Binyamin 88)

5. If a Jew participates in the baking process the bread is permissible, even if the rest of the baking process was completed by a non-Jewish baal habaayis.

6. It should be noted that regarding pas akum all agree that if a Jew lit the fire then the bread is pas yisroel. However, regarding bishul akum the Shulchan Aruch is of the opinion that turning on the fire does not suffice to create bishul yisroel.

Timers:

7. Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l (Minchas Yitzchak 4:28:4) writes that if a Jew set a timer that will ignite the oven, this is considered as if the Jew turned the oven and permits the bread even if a non-Jew placed it in the oven. Harav Shmuel Wosner shlit”a (Shevet Halevi 9:164), however, questions whether turning on the fire using a timer suffices, as the Jew is merely turning on the fire in an indirect way (grama). Harav Weiss acknowledges that the fire is being turned on indirectly, yet he feels that turning on the fire indirectly suffices.

8. Interestingly, the method that the OU recommends to accomplish pas yisroel is for the bakery to install an electric panel by a designated oven that enables that oven to be turned on off-site by a rabbinic field representative using a remote control telephone hook-up. This system meets the strictest of the kosher pas yisroel requirements and has received great approbation among leading rabbinic authorities. The device is known as the “Shain system,” named after a Rabbi Shain who made this innovation. It seems that even Harav Wosner would agree to the use of this device since the fire is turned on immediately by the Jew it is deemed as turning on the fire directly. As apposed to the use of a timer where, due to the delay, the Jew’s participation is deemed indirect.

9. However, Harav Moshe Heinemen shlit”a, in an article published on the Star-K website writes, “Can bishul Yisroel be achieved by setting a timer that will ignite the oven at set intervals? No. Since the Yehudi does not perform direct lighting of the oven it would not qualify for bishul Yisroel. In commercial settings (e.g. hotels, hospitals or factories) where large boilers provide the steam for the cooking equipment, bishul Yisroel requirements would be fulfilled if the Yehudi flips a switch or presses a button that directly ignites a boiler. If the action that is done by the Yehudi causes an indirect lighting of the oven, that action would not qualify for bishul Yisroel. Hence, dialing a number that in turn trips a switch that in turn lights an oven would be considered a “grama,” an indirect action that would not qualify for bishul Yisroel.” Harav Heinemen rules in accordance with Harav Wosner that lighting in an indirect way does not create bishul yisroel. In addition he seems to invalidate the Shain system, cited above, as he feels that this too is an indirect form of lighting. In Harav Belsky’s defense, most authorities maintain, regarding the laws of Shabbos, that an action that happens instantaneous can hardly be qualified as a grama.

כן מצאתי סברא זו במקום אחר בשו”ת ציץ אליעזר. שבסוף חלק ד’ מתשובותיו הביא הלכה בשם החזון איש בנוגע לממטרות, שמותר לפתוח את ברזי ההשקאה בשדה בערב שבת קודם הדלקת הנרות ולהשאירם פתוחים כל מה שצריך “וקודם שיסגור הברזים יסגור את הברז של הצנור הראשי המספק מים לכל הממטרות כדי שלא יגבר לחץ המים בצנור אחד השאר פתוח ע”י שסוגר את שני”, ע”כ. ובתשובותיו שבחלק ה’ (סימן ו’) הביא מכתב מהגאון רבי צבי פסח פראנק זצ”ל שיצא לחלוק על החזו”א מכמה טעמים וכתב דחומרא זו אין פנים בהלכה, וכתב: “ראשית אין סברא שסגירת בר זה יגרום להגדיל השטף בברז השני שע”פ רוב יש מים הרבה די להמיר, ובאשקיל עליה בידקא דמיא אמרינן דכחו לא הוי אלא כח ראשון לבד, ובנ”ד הוי כבר יש מים בהצינור ששוטפים והולכים להזרעים גם מקודם שנסגר הברז בביתו ושוב מה שיצאו הרי הם כח שני ולא כחו הוא”, עכ”ל הגרצפ”פ.
וכתב ע”ז הציץ אליעזר בלשון זה: “ובנוגע לטענה השניה די”ל דזה לא הוי כחו מכיון שיש כבר מים בהצינור ששוטפים והולכים להזרעים גם מקודם, נראה דיש מקום לדון ולומר דכ”ז היה ניחא אילו זרמת המים לא היו מתגברים מיד על אתר עם סגירת האדם את הברז, אבל מכיון שמתגברים על אתר מבלי שהיה כל שהו א”כ י”ל דכל בכגון דא מכיון שהכל בא מיד בפעם אחת ופעולה אחת דהיינו ע”י גרמת פעולתו, לא נחשב זה כח כחו כי אם כחו ממש וכו’ וכעין זה מובא גם בשם הדר”ג (שליט”א) [זצ”ל] בספר שביתת השבת (מלאכת טוחן אות נ”ז) לענין גדר גרמא, שכתב להוכיח דלענין חיוב במלאכת שבת דלא ליהוי גרמא תליא אי התחלת המלאכה נעשית תיכף עם סילוק ידים, דאי נעשית תיכף תו לא חשיב גרמא”, ע”ש.

ואגב ראינן דהגרצפ”פ ע”כ קסובר דשפיר שייך גרמא אף אי המעשה מתחלת מיד עם סילוק הידים, וממילא מובן דלשיטתו שפיר יכולים לומר בחשמל דהוי גרמא אף דנעשית מיד, אך צ”ע כי הגרצפ”פ בעצמו בתשובה הנדפס בספר שביתת השבת מפלפל ולומר דכל היכא דהתחלת המעשה נעשית תיכף עם סילק ידים ל”ה גרמא, וכמציין הבעל צי”א, ע”ש, ואולי חזר בו, וצ”ע

.
ושו”מ בשו”ת יביע אומר (ח”א או”ח ס’ י”ט אות ב’) שהביא הגאון רבי עובדיה יוסף זצ”ל משו”ת זרע אמת (ס’ מ”ד) שעמד על הסתירה דבשבת (קכ:) אמרינן, לא תעשה כל מלאכה, עשייה הוא דאסור הא גרמא שרי, ואילו בב”ק (ס.) אמרינן, דזורה ורוח מסייעתו, אע”ג דלגבי נזיקין פטור דהוי גרמא בנזקין, לענין שבת חייב, דמלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה. ותירץ דהיכא דהוי גרמא דלא עביד מעשה בשעת המלאכה רק עושה מעשה ואחר זמן ע”י מעשיו גרם שתעשה המלאכה מאליה ע”י ד”א, כגון במחיצות הכלים שמלאים מים, זוהי גרמא המותרת לענין שבת, אבל כשהוא עם המאלכה כגון זורה ורוח מסייעתו חייב, ע”ש. וע”פ דבריו הוכיח הגר”ע יוסף זצ”ל בנדידונו שם (לענין השתמשות במגביר רם קול ביו טוב) דאינו מקרי גרמא כשנעשית המלאכה תיכף, וז”ל: “ודון מינה ואוקי באתרין, שכיון שתיכף ומיד נעשית מלאכת ההבערה והכבוי ברוח שפתיו אין זה חשיב גרמא, ועשייה ממש הוא”, ע”כ. וכ”כ בשו”ת חלק לוי (חאו”ח ס”ס צ”ג), שכל שהפעולה נרגשת מיד חשיב כחו ולא גרמא, וכתב כן בדברי רש”י סנהדרין הנ”ל.

Pas Akum (Part 3)

(Before reading this post please read Pas Akum parts 1 and 2)

The Definition Of Pas Palter:

1. The Rama (112:2) explains that although palter is a baker, pas palter, regarding the halachos of pas akum, is defined as bread that was baked with the intention to be sold. Therefore, the bread of a non-Jewish housewife who bakes bread to sell to others is considered pas palter even though it was not baked by a baker. Conversely, if a non-Jewish baker baked bread specifically for his family it is considered regular, prohibited, pas akum since it was not baked to sell.

2. The definition of pas palter depends upon the actual baking of the bread, not whether it was eventually sold or it was given as a gift. Therefore, if a non-Jew purchased bread from a baker and gives it as a gift to a Jew, the Jew may eat the bread. Conversely, if a non-Jewish housewife baked bread for her own family and decides to sell it instead, a Jew may not eat the bread. (Shulchan Aruch 112:7)

Jewish Owned Bakery:

3. The reason that the edict was partially relaxed and pas palter is permissible was because it was too difficult for most Jews to observe. However, the edict remains in effect when it is readily observed. Accordingly, the Shach rules that bread that is owned by a Jew and baked by a non-Jew is prohibited. In such a circumstance it is relatively easy for the Jewish owner of the bread to at least participate in some minimal fashion in the preparation of the bread. The only thing that is permissible is bread owned and baked by a non-Jewish baker. The Chochmat Adam (65:6) also rules in accordance with the Shach.

4. It would appear, accordingly, that bread baked in a Jewish owned bakery should be required to be Pas Yisrael even according to the most lenient opinions. However, Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe Y.D. 45) rules that one may be lenient in such a situation if it is difficult to ensure that the bread is Pas Yisrael. Rav Moshe argues that the Shach is strict only in a situation where it is very easy for a Jew to participate in the baking. However, if it is difficult to hire Jewish bakers, as is sometimes the case in large factories, one may rule leniently and treat the bread as pas palter. Just as the Rabbi’s forbade pas akum and yet they permitted pas palter due to the the fact that it is difficult for many Jews to use a Jewish baker. Likewise, the sages forbade Jewish owned bread baked by a non-Jew and they permitted it in a situation where it is difficult to hire Jewish bakers.

5. Rav Elazar Hakohen Kahanow zt”l, Rosh Yeshivas Torah V’Daas, cites the view of Harav Moshe and questions his permissive view. He writes that according to the Shach, Jewish owned bread baked by a non-Jew was forbidden by the original ban and was not rescinded, therefore it should function like all rabbinic prohibitions and be forbidden under all circumstances. Even though in a factory setting it may be difficult to hire Jewish bakers, this case should still by forbidden under the prohibition of pas akum. (Hamesivta 5753 page 53)

What Is Considered Pas-

6. Only bread made from the five grains (wheat, barley, spelt, oats and rye) is considered bread regarding the rules of pas akum. However, bread made of other grains, such as rice bread or cornbread (into which no significant amount of flour from the five grains was added), is not considered bread with regard to the laws of pas akum. These breads are, by their very nature, inferior and eating them will not lead to intimacy. These breads are also exempt from the laws of bishul akum, since they are not fit to be served to nobility (See next chapter).

7. Cookies and Cakes: The Rama, in his Sefer Toras Chatas (75:12), writes that a sweet dough baked with a thick batter (belilah avah, such as cookies) has the status of bread and if baked by a palter, has the leniency of pas palter. Although, the bracha on such foods is Borei Minei Mezonos (which implies that they are not bread), since they can achieve the bracha of Hamotzei by merit of kevias seudah (eating them as a meal) they can be classified as pas palter.

The Rama is referring to the ruling of Pas Habaah Bikisnin. This teaches that one who eats cake, pie, or crackers as a meal (the amount of consumption required to be defined as a meal is beyond the scope of this work and for practical halacha a rabbi should be consulted) must treat the cake, pie or crackers as bread. He must wash, recite al netilas yadayim, and recite hamotzei, and then birchas hamazon after the meal. (See Shulchan Aruch O.C. 168:7)

Since all these foods have the potential halachic status of bread, they are subject to the rules of pas akum and pas palter, even when not eaten for a meal. [Were it not for this potential status of bread, these baked items would be considered bishul akum, and not pas akum. There status would then be stricter, since bishul akum is prohibited even when cooked by a professional chef – a palter.]

The Shach limits this ruling to Pas Habaah Bikisnin that is baked with a thick batter (Belilah Avah, such as most cookies). Pas Habaah Bikisnin that is baked with a thin batter (Belila Rakah, such as most cakes), rules the Shach, is subject to the rules of Bishul Akum.

Most authorities, including the Aruch Hashulchan (112:31), Beis Meir (112), Avnei Nezer (Y.D. 94:3) and Pri Chadash assume that even a thin batter of pas habaah bikisnin which is baked is treated as bread and has the rules of pas palter. This opinion is quite logical since this batter could have the status of bread, if one were to eat as a meal, they have the status of bread for our discussion. The Kashrus organization OU follows this view as well.

8. Bagels: Bagels are made by first boiling them in water and then baking them. One might think that since they are boiled they should be subject to the rules of Bishul Akum. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:33), however, writes that since the boiling does not render the bagels even minimally edible, the bagels are not considered to have been cooked. Therefore, bagels are subject to the rules of Pas Akum, just as one recites Hamotzi on bagels.

9. Doughnuts: There is a great debate amongst the poskim as to whether we treat doughnuts as pas (and it is treated as pas akum) or as a cooked item (and it has the rules of bishul akum). This argument is very closely related to a different argument amongst the poskim as to whether one recites the bracha of hamotzei on doughnuts or the bracha of mezonos and if the halacha changes if one eats enough doughnuts to constitute a meal.

The Shulchan Aruch cites an argument amongst the poskim regarding one who cooks or fries a thick dough (doughnuts), some feel that the bracha is mezonos (even if one eats a meal’s worth- Mishnah Berurah 168:70), while others recite the blessing of hamotzei. The Shulchan Aruch therefore concludes that those who fear Heaven should only eat such food during a bread meal. The Rama writes that the common custom is to recite mezonos and to follow the first view. (Shulchan Aruch Rama O.C. 168:13)

Harav Yisroel Belsky shlit”a, in a OU Kashrus Manual dedicated to the laws of Bishul Akum, writes that since normative halacha is to follow the view of the Rama and not to recite hamotzei on doughnuts therefore one can not treat it as bread and it does not have the laws of pas akum, rather it has the laws of bishul akum. It seems that this is also the view of Harav Herschel Shachter shlit”a.

Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l, however, writes that one may rely on those opinions that doughnuts are considered bread and are therefore allowed the leniencies of pas akum (Yechava Daas 5:53 and Halichos Olam vol. 7 page 106).

All would agree that a thin batter deep fried would not be considered bread.

10. Thin Dough – Crepe/Blintz: In the aforementioned OU Kashrus Manual, Harav Yisroel Belsky shlit”a and Harav Herschel Schachter shlit”a explain that the determining factor as to whether a food is a tavshil (cooked item and subject to the laws of bishul akum) or pas (and subject to the laws of pas akum) is whether one would recite hamotzei upon being kovea seudah on the food. As such, very thin crepe dough is a tavshil and is subject to the laws of bishul akum.

11. Pancakes and Waffles: Pancakes fried by a non-Jewish palter may be prohibited, depending upon whether or not they were fried in a significant amount of oil. Pancakes fried in a significant amount of oil are considered cooked, not baked. Even one who eats a meal of these pancakes recites a mezonos, not hamotzei. Therefore, they are included in the rules of bishul akum, not pas akum, and are prohibited even when made by a professional chef.

Pancakes fried without oil, or in a minimal amount of oil to prevent them from sticking to the pan, are considered pas and are permitted when fried by a palter. (Kaf Hachaim Y.D. 112:37,43)

The bracha for waffles is mezonos. According to most authorities one recites hamotzei upon being kovea seudah on waffles and such should be treated as bread and not a tavshil.(See Vezos Habracha page 28, Olas Yitzchak 36)

12. Glazed Bread: The Shulchan Aruch rules that bread that has an egg glaze is still considered pas and would have the permissible heter of pas palter. Although there is egg on the surface of the bread, and eggs are a tavshil and should be treated with the stringencies of bishul akum, it is deemed insignificant in comparison to the bread and is treated for this halacha as a part of the bread. The Rama, however, rules that bread that was made by a non-Jew and that is glazed with an egg is prohibited (assuming none of the leniencies of bishul akum apply).

In the OU Kashrus Manual page 47 it states, “This discussion raised the question that there should be a concern of bishul akum on white bread since it is glazed with egg (and the OU certifies white bread without addressing this)? Neither of the aforementioned reasons apply in this case because bread is served at shulchan melachim and the glaze is on the bread. Rabbi Luban noted that Gr”a (112:14) implies that Rama is discussing even a thin glaze of egg but Aruch Hashulchan (112:21) clearly rules that only a thick layer of egg is forbidden. Thus, according to Aruch Hashulchan there would be no concern of bishul akum for the glaze on white bread according to Gr”a there would be. Rav Belsky said that although the simple reading of Rama does not agree with Aruch Hashulchan’s interpretation, the glaze on the white bread is nonetheless permitted because it is barely visible and is not even the “b’en” which Rama refers to. Thus, although we do not agree with Aruch Hashulchan we can rely on it in this case. [However, the egg in French toast is quite visible and does not qualify for this heter].”

13. The following is a statement from the OU website: “Many cereals may be eaten during Asseres Yimay Teshuva because they lack tzuras hapas (for example shredded wheat and flakes). Rav Belsky and Rav Schachter also maintain that Cheerios is not considered pas, because of its small size and the way it is dried.”

Pas Akum (Part 2)- Pas Palter

(Before reading this article please read “Pas Akum Part 1”)

Pas Palter And Pas Baal Habayis-

1. The Tur writes that when the prohibition of pas akum was originally instituted, it was not widely accepted by Klal Yisroel. The reason that the decree was not accepted was that bread is a staple food upon which people’s lives depend, and the prohibition of bread baked by a non-Jew caused hardship for many Jews who lived in an area without Jewish bakers. [According to others this decree was officially rescinded by a later beis din because of the hardships it posed to daily living. (See Ran)]

2. According to virtually all of the authorities the decree was only rescinded to allow Jews to eat pas palter, or baker’s bread. However, one may not eat bread baked by a private non-professional non-Jew, pas baal habayis. [There are extreme cases of urgency when even pas baal habayis is permitted, see Shulchan Aruch 112:8 and Aruch Hashulchan 17-18.]

3. There is a logical difference between bread baked by a non-professional (baal habayis), non-Jew and bread baked by a non-Jewish, professional baker. The prohibition of pas akum was instituted because of the possibility of closeness and eventual intermarriage. This concern is reasonable only when a non-professional non-Jew bakes bread and gives it to his Jewish neighbor. Such a relationship can cause friendliness and camaraderie. However, when a professional baker sells bread (pas palter), it is strictly a business relationship, there is no social or intimate interaction and the chance of intermarriage is greatly diminished.

Sefardic Custom:

4. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 112:2) writes that one may only eat pas palter if there is no pas yisroel (Jewish baked bread) available. The poskim explain that according to Sefardic tradition, one may not eat pas paltar if pas yisroel can be found within one mil (this is approxamitely .72 or .6 of a mile according to the Chazon Ish and Rav Chaim Naeh, respectively). According to most authorities, this is the distance that one can walk in 18 minutes. One who is traveling may not eat pas paltar if pas Yisroel is available within four mil in the direction that he is traveling or one mil in the opposite or side direction. (Shulchan Aruch 112:16, Darkei Teshuva 95)

5. However, the Shulchan Aruch (112:5) notes that there are those (the Rashba) who rule that if the available Pat Akum is of superior quality to the available Pat Yisrael in a particular locale (or the type of bread that one wants is not available in pas yisroel), then in that locale it is considered that Pat Yisrael is not available and one may eat the pas akum. Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe Y.D. 2:33) asserts that the fact that the Shulchan Aruch does not cite the dissenting opinion (the Tur) to the Rashba’s leniency indicates that the Shulchan Aruch accepts the Rashba’s leniency as normative.

6. Harav Binyamin Cohen shlit”a (Chelkas Binyamin 112:18:81) writes that according to the Shulchan Aruch one can not eat pas palter if there is pas yisroel available, even if the pas yisroel is more expensive. The aforementioned heter is only if the pas palter is of better quality. However, one may question this asssertion, as it is reasonable to contend that if the pas yisroel is more expensive then the pas palter becomes of “superior quality” in the eyes of the buyer as it is more affordable. And perhaps in this instance we can also consider it as if pas yisroel is not available. For normative halacha, a rabbi should be consulted.

7. A lenient ruling was expressed by the Kenesses Hagedolah. He writes that the Shulchan Aruch only forbade pas palter if the Jewish baker can single-handedly bake enough bread for the entire Jewish community if they are only buying Jewish bread. However, if the Jewish bakers can not bake enough bread for the entire Jewish community (even though they can supply the individual who needs bread) one may purchase pas palter. This teaching is also cited by Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yechava Daas 5:53).

Ashkenazim Custom:

8. The Rama writes that one may eat pas palter even if pas yisroel is available. [Interestingly, the Ben Ish Chai (Shana 2 Chukas 2) cites the view of the Rama and writes that in Baghdad the common custom is to follow the lenient view of the Rama

9. The Shach (112:8) rules that even Ashkenazic Jews should follow the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch and refrain from eating pas palter when there is pat Yisroel available. The Shach adds that one may rely on the opinion of Rashba that one may eat pas palter when it is qualitatively superior to pat Yisrael. The Aruch Hashulchan (112:17) also writes that in his local the common custom is to rule stringently. Indeed, the Arizal feels that one should be very particular not to eat pas palter (Darkei Teshuva 112:18).

View Of Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l:

10. Rav Menachem Genack in Mesorah 1:94 cites a ruling of Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l to Rav Nata Greenblatt shlit”a that even those who are strict regarding pas palter might be lenient regarding factory produced bread (in a manner that one could not do with household equipment). Concern for social interaction and intermarriage is entirely irrelevant when purchasing factory produced bread, as there is no contact between the baker and the purchaser. There is room, by contrast, to be strict regarding the Palter discussed in the classic sources, as there is contact between the purchaser and the Palter, so there is some concern for intermarriage. One might argue, however, that “lo plug rabbanun,” that rabbinic decrees apply even when the reasons for their enactment do not. Rav Moshe suggests that Chazal’s edict never applied when the bread is baked using industrial equipment that is not used in a home setting. Chazal’s enactment does not apply to industrial baking, since such equipment is never used for baking in a context where there is contact between the baker and purchaser (home or bakery).

11. This is also quoted in Shu”t Rivevos Efraim (5:596) where he adds that Rav Reuven Feinstein confirmed that this indeed was his father’s opinion. Harav Yitzchak Weiss zt”l (Minchas Yitzchak 3:26) accept this leniency when it is combined with other questionable situations (as a snif lehakel). The policy of the OU is to only rely on the opinion of Rav Moshe if there are also other reasons to be lenient (refer to OU Kashrus Manual Bishul Akum page 15).

12. According to this view of Rav Moshe zt”l both Ashkenazim and Sefardim may eat factory baked pas palter, even if pas yisroel is available.

13. The Chazon Ish, cited by Harav Shmuel Wosner shlit”a, however, was unconvinced, and maintained that a factory setting would not be considered any different than any other type of bakery. (Shevet Halevi 6:108:6)

Aseres Yimei Teshuva:

14. During the Aseres Yimei Teshuva (the ten days between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur) even Ashkenazik Jews should eat only pas yisroel and not pas palter. (Shach 112:9)

15. The Darkei Teshuva cites poskim who maintain that during these days one should not eat pas palter even if it is of superior quality to the pas yisroel.

16. We shall explain in the next post that if a Jew participated in the baking by turning on the fire, stoaking the coals or by throwing a piece of wood into the fire (regardless of the size) the bread is pas yisroel. The Pri Megadim (Sifsei Daas 8) writes that likewise during the Aseres Yimei Teshuva one may eat the bread if a Jew participated in the baking. It seems that he feels that this is permissible even l’chatchila. However, the Mishnah Berurah (503) implies that during the Aseres Yimei Teshuva one should avoid eating this bread. As he writes that if one has no other bread then one should have the non-jew bake bread with the participation of the Jew.

Shabbos:

17. The Mishnah Berurah (242:6) cites Achronim who state that, out of honor of Shabbos and Yom Tov, one should try not to eat pas paltur on Shabbos and Yom Tov (e.g. one should therefore refrain from eating Stella Dora® cookies on Shabbos).

18. If one has no pas yisroel available, one may use pas paltur for lechem mishnah on Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Pas Akum (Part 1) – Bread Baked By Non-Observant Jews

The Source-

1. Our Sages forbade all bread baked by a non-Jew. This prohibition is referred to as pas akum. Chazal created this prohibition as a precaution against unnecessary socialization with non-Jews that could lead to intermarriage. (Avodah Zara 35b, Rambam Machalos Asuros 17:9, Tur and Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 112)

2. It should be noted that there is a separate, but similar prohibition against all food cooked by a non-Jew, known as bishul akum. In this chapter we will be discussing the prohibition of pas akum. Although both are foods prepared by a non-Jew and are governed by similar rules, they are different in some aspects. Regarding certain applications, pas akum is stricter than bishul akum, where as with regard to other applications, bishul akum is stricter.

3. Although the poskim use the term akum, which literally translates a worshiper of stars and constellations (avodas kochavim u’mazalos), or idolater, the prohibition of pas akum applies equally to any non-Jew, regardless in his belief. Therefore, bread baked by a Moslem or even a non-Jew who keeps the seven Noahide laws is subject to this prohibition. This prohibition was created to avoid intermarriage and therefore all non-Jewish bread is forbidden. (Darkei Teshuva 112:4, Sefas Emes 112, Halichos Olam vol. 7 page 91)

4. Chazal did not differentiate between different individual situations. Therefore, one may not even eat bread baked by a married old non-Jew who has no children, even though, in this case there is hardly any reasonable possibility of intermarriage. Similarly, even monk’s bread is prohibited, even though a monk is forbidden to marry. (Rama, Shach and Pri Megadim 112:1)

5. It should also be stressed that whenever we “permit” eating bread baked by a non-Jew, we are assuming that the bread is completely free of any non-kosher material and that it has been prepared in kosher utensils with a kosher oven. One who has not checked the ingredients of the bread and the manner in which it was prepared may not eat any bread from a non-Jewish (or an unreliable Jewish) baker.

Non-Observant Jews

6. The Tiferes L’Moshe (cited by Pischei Teshuva 112:1) maintains that bread baked by a Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos is permissible. The reason for this prohibition is to avoid intermarriage which would not apply to bread baked by a Jew even if he desecrates Shabbos. This is also the view of Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yabia Omer Y.D. 5:10) and the Tzitz Eliezer (9:41). Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l also seems to be leaning towards a lenient view (Y.D. 45).

7. The Sefer Shivilei Dovid (112:1) disagrees and he rules that bread baked by a public desecrator of Shabbos is forbidden. This is also the view of the Pri Megadim, Avnei Nezer (Y.D. 92), Pri Chadash (See Yabia Omer and Chazon Ish Y.D. 2:23), Chazon Ish and Rav Elazar Hakohen Kahanow zt”l Rosh Yeshivas Torah V’Daas (Mesivta 5753 page 50). The view of these poskim is seemingly problematic, as there is no concern of intermarriage there should be no reason for the prohibiton.

8. To answer this question it is necessary to introduce a similar halachic discussion. Our Sages forbade all non-Jewish wine, or even wine that was touched by a non-Jew, as a precaution to avoid intermarriage (Avoda Zara 29. The Rishonim write that one may not even drink wine that was touched by Jew who publicly desecrates Shabbos (Bahag Shechita, Beis Yosef 119 citing the Rashba).

9. The Chasam Sofer (Y.D. 120, see also Har Tzvi Y.D. 105) wonders why the wine is prohibited if one may marry a Jew who desecrates Shabbos and there is no concern of intermarriage. He explains, based on the Gemara in Chullin (5), that if one serves Idolatry he is punished that he has the hallachic status of a non-Jew. Similarly, one who desecrates Shabbos in the presence of ten Jews has the halachic status of a non-Jew. The reason for this is that we keep Shabbos because Hashem rested on the seventh day after creating the world in the first six days. One who does not keep Shabbos is thereby questioning the fact that Hashem rested after creating the world. Therefore, one who desecrates Shabbos is akin to serving Idolatry and is therefore punished that he strictly treated as non-Jew in halacha. Since he has the status of a non-Jew his wine is forbidden, even though there is no concern of intermarriage. This same line of reasoning can be extended to prohibit the bread baked by a non-observant Jew.

Publicly Desecrating Shabbos:

10. However, as we shall discuss, in many instances even the Chazon Ish, Pri Megadim etc. would permit break baked by a non-observant Jew. The Poskim stress that there are many requirements that one needs to meet to be classified in hallacha as a “public” desecrater of shabbos. And if one fails to meet these requirements he is considered a “private” desecrater of shabbos and keeps his status of a Jew in hallacha. The following are some of those requirements:

11. The Baal Haitur (cited in Beis Yosef Y.D. 44 and Tashbeitz 3:43) writes that only one who violates shabbos through working the fields (planting, threshing etc.) is deemed a public desecrater of shabbos. One who violates shabbos in any other fashion keeps his hallachic status of a Jew. Rav Akiva Eiger zt”l (Y.D. 264 see also Daas Torah Y.D. 2:27) writes that he does not understand the reasoning of the Baal Haitur. He also notes that he no other posek shares the same view and it is therefore difficult to rely upon his opinion for a hallachic ruling.

12. The Chaya Adam rules that if one were to refrain from breaking Shabbos in front of a rabbi (or ones parents) he keeps the hallachic status of a Jew. It is clear that he feels a level of embarrassment for his actions and is not turning his back completely on his religion.17

כתבו הפוסקים דכל שבוש מלחלל שבת בפני אדם חשוב כגון רב וכדו’ אין דינו כמחלל שבת בפרהסיא לענין זה שחשיב כגוי. וכ”כ החיי אדם (כלל ע”ה ס”ק כ”ו): “ישראל מומר או רשע שמחלל שבת בפרהסיא, אפילו אינו מחלל אלא באיסור דרבנן, הרי הוא כנכרי וכו’ ואם מתבייש לחלל בפני אדם גדול, לא מיקרי בפרהסיא”. אולם המנחת אלעזר (ח”ג ס’ כ”ד) חולק עליו. ובספר הליכות שלמה חלק ג’ דף שכ”ה הביא מהג”ר שלמה זלמן אורבך זצ”ל וז”ל: “וה”ה כשבוש בכך בפני אביו או אמו וכדו’ ואינו מחלל שבת במחיצתם, וכהיום רבים מאלה שלצערנו אינם שומרי תומ”צ הריהם בכלל זה”. ועוד שם הביא מתלמידים וז”ל: “ומ”מ מה שנמנע מלחלל שבת בפני אחיו וכדו’ היה נראה מדברי רבינו דאין לראות זאת אלא כנימוס בעלמא ולא מפני הבושה וכו’ ואף לענין הנמנע מלחלל שבת לפני אדם חשוב, הורה רבינו דאם ניכר להדיא שהימנעותו היא אך ורק מפני הנימוס גרידא ולא מפני הבושה, אין להקל”.

13. Rav Akiva Eiger zt”l (ibid.) feels that one is required to violate shabbos in the presence of ten shabbos observant Jews and only then is he considered one who violated shabbos on a public level. Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Y.D. 70) disagrees and explains that this hallacha applies even if one breaks shabbos in the presence of ten non-observant Jews.

14. The Achronim disagree if one violates shabbos through a rabbinic act (ex. Muktza) if he then has the status of a public desecrater of shabbos or does the hallacha apply only to those who desecrate shabbos on a biblical level.(see Radvaz 2:796, Rav Akiva Eiger Y.D. 2 and Yabia Omer 1 Y.D. 11:24)

Tinuk Shenishba:

15. Even one who desecrates Shabbos publicly according to all of the authorities may still have the status of a Jew in halacha, as we shall explain. The Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva (3:9), after defining minim, apikorsim, and kofrim as individuals who reject one of the many principles of Judaism, writes: “Among Israel, there are two categories of mumarim: a mumar in regard to a single mitzvah and a mumar in regard to the entire Torah. A mumar in regard to a single mitzvah is someone who has made a practice of willfully committing a particular sin [to the point where] he is accustomed to committing it… [This applies] even though [the sin] is one of the minor ones. For example, someone who has made a practice of constantly wearing sha’atnez or cutting off his sideburns so that it appears that, in regard to him, it is as if this mitzvah has been nullified entirely. Such a person is considered a mumar in regard to that matter. This applies [only] if he [commits the sin] with the intent of angering G-d. An example of a mumar in regard to the entire Torah is one who turned to the faith of the gentiles when they enact [harsh] decrees [against the Jews] and clings to them.”

16. In Hillchos Shechita (4:14) he writes that a Jew who serves idolatry or one who publicly desecrates shabbos is considered (in hallacha) like a non-Jew and if he slaughters, the animal is rendered a neveilah.

17. Thus the Rambam has described people who are deficient in their observance of the mitzvos. It would thus seem that all non-observant Jews fall into one of these categories.

18. This would indeed be the case if not for a distinction made by the Rambam. The Rambam in hilchos Mamrim (3:3) writes the following: “To whom does this all apply? Only to a person who denied the Oral Law consciously and instead followed after his frivolous thoughts… The children of these errant people and their grandchildren whose parents led them away and they were born among these Karaities and raised according to their conception, they are considered as ‘children captured amongst the nations and raised by them’ (Tinokos Shenishbu). Such a child may not be eager to follow the path of mitzvot, for it is as if he was compelled not to. Even if later, he hears that he is Jewish and saw Jews and their faith, he is still considered as one who was compelled against observance, for he was raised according to their mistaken path… Therefore it is appropriate to motivate them to repent and draw them to the power of the Torah with words of peace.” The Rambam is thus telling us a very novel concept and that is, in order to determine the hallachic status of any Jew we must first inquire into the many different factors which have determined his development and behavior.

19. The Poskim have employed the opinion of the Rambam and have ruled leniently regarding many Sabbath desecrators that they remain their status of Jews. Rav Yehuda Ettlinger zt”l (Binyan Tzion 23) writes that the derogatory label of a public desecrater of shabbos, which implies brazen rejection of the belief in the Creation of the universe, cannot be attributed to many German Jews who lit candles, made Kiddush etc., yet openly violated the laws of the Shabbos. He writes: “The only reason a Sabbath violator is considered a mumar is because he who denies creation and the Creator as well. However, this person confesses his faith by prayer, Kiddush etc. Certainly the children of these people never knew and never heard of the laws of Shabbos and they are in all respects… like a tinok shenishba bein ha-akum. This is the case unless it is clear to us that a particular individual is familiar with the laws of Shabbos and brazenly desecrates Shabbos in the presence of ten men despite this knowledge. Such a person is definitely considered a mumar.”

20. This heter can obviously not be applied blindly to all non-observant Jews as there are many Jews who do not fall under the category of tinuk shenishba. This, like all halachos, requires discretion and the consultation of a noted posek.

21. It is also worthy to note the opinion of Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe 1:33). Rav Moshe was asked how to determine the status of many Jews who believe that G-d Created the universe, however, due to fear of losing their livelihood are forced to work on Shabbos. He ruled leniently regarding the matter and his reasoning may be applicable to our discussion. He begins by explaining that the reason a “public” desecrater of Shabbos has the status of a non-Jew while one who desecrates shabbos privately receives no change of status, even though both acts are inherently the same. He explains that desecrating Shabbos is only considered a brazen act of kefira (heresy) if one does so to attack G-d and Judaism. If one does so for reasons of monetary gain and the like should not be classified as a non-Jew. Therefore, when one violates shabbos privately we are allowed to assume that he is doing so out of necessity and not as an act of aggression towards G-d. This leniency is not given towards a public desecration of Shabbos because the act itself is perceived by onlookers as an act of aggression and even if he is adamant that he is doing so for personal reasons we do not believe him. If that is the case, advances Rav Moshe, the argument can be made that even if one publicly desecrates Shabbos if it is clear to all the onlookers that he is doing so only for monetary reasons (which was the case at the time of Rav Moshe as many Jews would daven Vasikin, make Kiddush and then drive to work) he remains a Jew in halacha. The same argument can possibly be made regarding the vast majority of non-observant Jews. Since the average onlooker excuses their actions as being based on a lack of education of Judaism and its laws and not as an act of aggression towards G-d, we cannot classify them as non-Jews in halacha.

22. Based on the above halachos, not all desecrators of Shabbos have the status of non-Jews in halacha and one would be permitted to eat their bread. It is therefore necessary to consult a competent Rabbi whenever the question presents itself.

Tachanun When A Chosson Is Present

1. The chosson does not recite tachanun during the seven festive days. Any minyan where the chosson is present does not recite tachanun. (Shulchan Aruch 131:4 and Mishnah Berurah)

2. If the chosson left the synagogue before tachanun the poskim disagree as to whether tachanun is recited. (Ishei Yisroel page 268)

3. If the chosson is not in the Synagogue but the kallah is in the women’s section, tachanun is still recited. (Yaskil Avdi 7 Hashmatos 3 and Shevet Halevi 5:12)

4. The Maharsham (Daas Torah 131:4) writes that even if the chosson is not praying with the minyan, his mere presence warrants the omission of tachanun. However, the Aishal Avraham of Botchetch writes that if the chosson is in the Synagogue but is not praying with the minyan, tachanun should be recited. It is preferable, however, for him to avoid this question by leaving before tachanun. This is also the view of Rav Ovadia Hadaya zt”l. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l says that if the chosson enters a synagogue not intending to stay long and he happens to be present when the congregation is about to pray tachanun, then tachanun should be recited. If, however, the chosson intends to stay in the synagogue, even if he is not praying with the minyan, tachanun is omitted. (Shalmei Simcha page 139)

5. If there is a “break away minyan” outside of the main synagogue and there is a chosson praying in the main synagogue, the poskim discuss whether tachanun is recited in the “break away minyan.” They conclude that if the “break away minyan” has its own aron kodesh and bima, it is then considered it’s own synagogue and they would recite tachanun. If, however it does not have an aron kodesh and bima, it is considered an extension of the main synagogue and this minyan is also freed from the obligation to recite tachanun. (See Shulchan Haezer vol. 2 page 119)

6. The Taz writes that it is better for the chosson to pray on his own this week, then to pray with a minyan because his attendance will cause the omission of tachanun. The Sefer Toras Chaim strongly questions this ruling. He cites many poskim who say that if the chosson steps out of the Synagogue before tachanun, then the tzibbur does not omit tachanun. Therefore, argues the Toras Chaim, the chosson can attend the minyan and just step out before the tachanun prayer is recited. This way he will be able to pray with a minyan. (We have seen that it is indeed an argument among the poskim whether tachanun is recited if the chosson left the synagogue (Halacha 2) before tachanun. Perhaps this is the area of contention between the Toras Chaim and the Taz.) The Sefer Shulchan Haezer rules in accordance with the Taz. He adds that the chosson should preferably gather a minyan together in his home.

Performing Mitzvos Through The Use of Telephones and Microphones

1. The poskim discuss whether one may answer Amen to a blessing that is said using a microphone and whether one may fulfill any mitzvos, such as havdalah and megillah, using a microphone or telephone. This debate is extremely relevant at weddings, since in most cases the rabbi uses a microphone when reciting the brachos under the chuppah.

2. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l (Minchas Shlomo 1:9) writes that one may not fulfill any obligations through the use of microphones, telephones, radios or hearing aids. Both the telephone and the public address system “transform” sound waves in air, e.g., spoken words, into an electrical current within the instrument, and, ultimately, back into sound waves. The sound that people hear was not the actual sound waves created by the speaker. This disconnect, between the speaker and the audience, prevents the listener from fulfilling any mitzvos through this medium.

3. Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l explains that when one hears a blessing over the microphone, from a hallachic perspective, one has not actually heard the blessing because there is a separation between the speaker and the listener. Rather, one is merely aware that a blessing is being recited. This is very similar to the synagogue in Alexandria (see Gemara Succah 51b), where most people did not hear the blessings being recited because of its vast size, but were nevertheless permitted to answer amen when signaled to do so by the waving of a flag. Therefore, concludes Harav Auerbach zt”l, one may only respond Amen to blessings that he is not obligated to hear, as was the case in Alexandria, but one may not respond Amen to blessings that one must hear, such as havdalah. He adds, that it is only permitted to respond amen if one is in the same room as the person who is reciting the blessing. If one hears a blessing over the telephone, one may not respond amen.

4. According to Harav Shlomo Zalman one should not recite the blessings using a microphone. If one did, then the assembly may respond Amen. Indeed, the Beis Din Tzedek of Yerushalayim signed a petition against the usage of microphones under the chuppah.(See Koveitz Ohr Yisroel 13)

5. The Chazon Ish (cited in Minchas Shlomo) questioned the view of Harav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l. He feels that because the person is creating the sound wave and it is heard immediately, perhaps one can fulfill his mitzvah by listening to the microphone or telephone. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Igros Moshe O.C. 2:108, O.C. 4:91:4) likewise argued that one may fulfill mitzvos using these devices. He adds that every time someone hears havdalah he does not hear the person’s voice in his ears, rather, the speaker causes sound waves which travel from the speaker’s mouth to the ear of the listener. Since one always fulfills mitzvos by hearing sound waves created by the speaker, it may not make a difference whether one hears the original waves or waves that were temporarily converted into electrical currents. As long as one hears sounds that originated from an adult jewish male (without a time delay), one can fulfill his mitzvos. Harav Moshe concludes that in case of necessity one may fulfill mitzvos through listening to a microphone. A similar view is expressed by the Tzitz Eliezer (8:11). [It should be noted that using these machines for the shofar on Rosh Hashana is far more complicated and not part of this discussion]

6. According to Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l one may respond amen to blessings recited using a microphone.

7. Harav Ovadia Yosef zt”l (Yechava Daas 4:54) rules that one may not fulfill mitzvos through the use of telephones and microphones. However, if one is standing close enough to the one who is speaking that he would have been able to hear him without the microphone, then he may fulfill his obligation. This is true even if he also hears the sound of the microphone and the sound is louder and more amplified. Those who are sitting far away and would not be able to hear him if not for the microphone, may not fulfill their obligations.

8. The common custom is to use a microphone when reciting the blessings under the chuppah. For normative halacha, a rabbi should be consulted.